The win is illustrated in the note below. It is an extract of an email I was copied on 10/28/24. The red highlights are mine. There are a lot of people to thank but that is not the purpose of this article. This is a call to action….and it needs to be done quick. The good news is that the requests are not so difficult such that they can be done quick and they don’t take money and I don’t want money.

If your state or county does have risk limiting audits, but they have not accounted for the Absentee or Early vote in the sampling schemes for such audits, or the sampling schemes are undefined and in that “gray area” this approach could apply and help even at this late date.

If this approach can be applied in your state it has the potential to reveal cheating after the election. By having that potential it could also be a deterrent and prevent cheating from occurring in the first place. In Delaware, no court battle was required….to achieve the result above. There are simple action items that should be done NOW before a winner of the election is announced. Please read and if you feel this has merit please act or forward to people you know who act regarding election integrity issues. The action could be as simple as sending emails to appropriate authorities and having those emails acknowledged on record before the results of the election are announced.

Details:

Over 2 years ago I discovered a gaping quality control hole in the Election Systems in Delaware.  In practice, I noticed that the post election “risk limiting audits”, did not include any sample schemes to account for the Absentee or Early Vote ballots. I reviewed our code. I believe that it explicitly requires audit of the Absentee and Early Vote Ballots. The audit procedures that have been in place, may have been in place prior to the advent of “Early in Person” voting and simply continued along as routine even after the advent of Early Voting. In practice, they only sampled the “Day of In Person” voting machines.

Here is an excerpt of the code. 

The Department shall audit all results of 1 randomly selected election district in each county and………

The key word is “ALL”

Now in Delaware this language is explicit. It says ALL. Even if it is not stated explicitly in your state, I say the argument can work. Anyone that would argue that the sampling scheme should not account for the Absentee and Early Vote in essence must argue they believe it is OK to leave 20%-30% of our vote more vulnerable to electronic tampering than the rest of the vote. I hope you would agree that would be a ridiculous argument. Authorities did not do that in DE. There was silence, ignoring, never responding to the issue for a long time……… but never a counter argument…….and then the result above.

Even if it is not explicitly mentioned you could argue that the sampling scheme should include the Absentee and Early Vote. I made both arguments. I said I believed it is explicitly required, and I also said if anyone would like to make a counter argument please stand up and provide your name and stand behind that argument and I will make you famous! I don’t know which portion of the arguments won the day, but without a lawsuit you see the result above. We still need to be diligent on the details of the audit but first things first.

The links to articles providing more background and details on this topic are here if you have an interest.

https://delawarecounts.com/publish/posts/detail/147244507?referrer=%2Fpublish%2Fposts

https://delawarecounts.com/p/proof-of-process-problems

THE CURSE BECOMES A BLESSING?    

Many people like myself who are interested in Election Integrity believe the vulnerabilities associated with Early and Absentee voting are a big concern.  I believe the sampling rate on the risk limiting audits are too low, and when localized to one geography (the precinct) would be too easy to cheat.   If however, you can get agreement for such audits to include the Absentee and Early Vote Ballots, hmmmm, could the perceived curse be a blessing in disguise?

In any proper audit to check the machines, you must account for ALL pieces of paper (ballots) for the defined geography. In a state like Delaware, where we used to only be able to vote “in person” at one voting location on the day of the election that would restrict the audit to the singular polling location for that Election District (precinct). You might be talking 3-4 machines and 1000 +/- ballots. Very easy to account for total pieces of paper, and undervotes. Undervotes are ballots where a person may have chosen to not select any candidate in that particular race. It all has to reconcile.

Early Voting: Early voting changes the game. It is typically done at Early Vote Locations.  At Early Vote Locations you can often vote the ballot design for a larger geography like an entire county. THEREIN LIES THE BLESSING.  If one must audit the early vote ballots for a precinct, THEY MUST TOUCH EVERY BALLOT IN THAT LARGER GEOGRAPHY to insure that they have found every single ballot for that precinct. 

You can not take “the machines word” as to where such ballots might be located because the purpose of the audit is to check on the machines.  The ramification is that now, for that little precinct audit, you get a confirmation of the entire total “pieces of paper” ballot count for the entire county or that larger geography. It does not give you the count for each race on each ballot throughout the county, but if you get a total count of ballots, many electronic stuffing schemes will be caught. The audit of the individual race results in the randomly selected precincts may reveal “flipping” schemes.

NEED TO ACT NOW:

At this late date you can make the logical arguments above to the appropriate authorities in your state. Get it on record, get it in email, get that email acknowledged. If you have resources, submit a legal case to the courts with a date. In my opinion, and also a hat tip to Marley Hornik on this, it needs to get done before the election to have a better chance of having standing after the election. In some ways the “standing” argument from the courts perspective is that: if this was a concern Mr. Plaintiff, why didn’t you say it before the election. You are coming to me now after the election because your candidate lost. GET THE REQUEST ON RECORD BEFORE THE ELECTION RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED!

Recommendations:  Step by Step.

1.  Review the Code:  Find the portion of your code that references the post-election audits in your state, and develop the argument that shows that this implies the audit of all the vote for whatever geography is defined.

2.  Review the Logistics of Your Early Voting Law:  See if it agrees with the argument above and that it will require touching ALL ballots in that geography.

3.  Write Lawsuits or Letters on the Record: Write them to those responsible for performing the post election audits.  Do it now so you have better chance of having standing after the election.

4. Let people know. We do want this word to get out to any cheaters. Either it will be a deterrent OR they will have to stand up and argue why they think it acceptable to leave the Absentee and Early vote excluded from the critical Quality Control process they say is required for all the other ballots and that they say justifies the use of the machines.

2024 Early Vote Ballots being scanned. (Link to video)

Executive Summary:  

“Scanning” of 17 batches of Early Vote ballots, was observed in New Castle County (NCC) Delaware.  A total of 3,220 ballots were scanned.  A video of two machines operating side by side is presented showing ballots being rejected at high rates for a given “pass”.  This is not an experimental study.  These are actually 2024 ballots.   Significant jams, pauses, and mid-pass cleanings were required during processing.  The number of “passes” required to process a batch were tracked.  The number of “Rejects” for each “pass” was tracked.  “First Pass Rejects” (FPR) of ballots through the machines averaged 15% with FPR rates of over 50% observed.  Thirty Five percent (35%) of the batches required more than 5 passes, and one batch required 13 passes.  The number of “re-made” ballots is reported.  It is believed the results do not achieve the EAC VVSG standards required for purchase of voting systems in Delaware.  Currently the State of Delaware does not perform risk limiting audits on this part of the system.  Based on the performance observed here it is recommended that the State of Delaware implement 100% redundant hand count audit of the Absentee and Early Vote Ballots and do this prior to certification of the 2024 election.

Details:

The scanning room in NCC is shown below.  There are 4 machines.  For purposes of this article I have identified them left to right as stations 1-4 respectively.  It was reported by DOE personnel that they were set-up to scan Absentee Ballots at stations 1 and 2, and early vote ballots on stations 3 and 4.  This article will report on a scanning session where stations 3 and 4 were put into action.

I graduated as a Chemical Engineer and long ago worked in industrial processing plants.  Actually paper mills.  Machines that processed paper at high speeds.  As an engineer, as a citizen I was shocked at the process I observed.  I watched several batches of ballots not being able to make a complete “pass” with-out getting “jammed” or “paused” several times.  Also during each “pass” the machine would reject ballots if it could not read them. 

The video shows 2 machines operating simultaneously during a single “pass” of ballots.  What you see has been edited down from a 2 minute video.  I edited out the portions of the video that showed the operator to respect his or her privacy.  This is NOT a hidden camera.  This scanning is an open public meeting, and advertised by the State of Delaware.  I asked if I could use a camera at the beginning of the session and was approved by DOE personnel. 

In the video you will see ballots being automatically fed into the machine going “around” the curved metal guide and then ultimately being either “accepted” or “rejected”.  If the scanner “thinks” it knows what the ballot says, it “accepts” the ballot and deposits the ballot on the bottom of the three receiver trays.  If the scanner “doesn’t know” what the ballot says it will deposit the ballot in the upper tray.  During this video, notice how many ballots get deposited in the upper tray at station 4.  You don’t have to count them one by one for detailed data.  The primary message will be glaringly obvious.  You may be shocked to see so many ballots getting “rejected” in a pass.  That is not necessarily the worst case.  In many cases, the machines didn’t even get through a “pass”.  They, “jam”, or “pause” for some reason.  At times you will see an error message like “multi-feed”.  At times you will have a “multi-feed” and not see that error message.

Here is a screen shot after a “pass” showing what the machine thinks was the total and what is the number it thinks is in the reject (top) bin. 

As you watch the video, and ballots being rejected, and the rest of this article please keep in mind a few things.  

1.  Logic and Accuracy Tests:  (LAT’s)  Each of these scanners should have passed an LAT and have been “ready to go”!  The “Early In Person” machines that marked these ballots should have been through their own LAT’s and “ready to go”.  Typically these “tests” amount to running about 5-6 ballots through each machine.  Based on what you observe here how do you feel about the maintenance, testing, and preparation of this combination of machines?

2.  NO QC AUDITS:   For quality control, the “Day of In Person” voting machines in DE are subject to post election “Risk Limiting Audits”.  Now these scanners that process all the Early In Person, and Absentee vote are not!  I believe the Delaware Code requires that these machines be audited and have written and informed the Board of Election and the Department of Elections officially on the record in multiple occasions.  They do not acknowledge the issue.

So what happens when ballots won’t go through the machine on the first pass?  What happens is that the operator presses a few buttons and then the operator takes the “rejects” from the reject tray and puts them back into the feed tray and runs them again, again and again, hoping that there will finally be no rejects.  Often between subsequent runs the operator turns the ballots over, or around 180 degrees or does a “cleaning” in hopes that will help.  You may be thinking I am exaggerating with the “again, and again, and again” statement.  I am not.  One of the batches required 13 passes.

At times, no matter how many passes, a ballot just wouldn’t scan, or at least the machine implied it didn’t scan.  If there are no audits, how does one really know?  In any case, when the machine implies that the ballot didn’t scan, the ballot was “re-made” on a voting machine that is in the room.  That new ballot replaces the ballot that didn’t run.  The re-made ballot is witnessed and inspected and compared to the first by a second person that did not create it.  I saw the original ballot segregated, I did not see it “spoiled”.

Summary Results: 

The results of this processing is shown in the table below.  A few highlight observations.

Of the total of 17 runs, only 1 batch of ballots made it through on the first pass.  The highest number of passes was 13.  The average first pass reject rate was on the order 15% with the highest being over 50%.  A total of 6/17 or 35% of the batches took more than 5 passes to process. 

In addition to “pass rejects” we must also consider that the machines jammed, had, error messages, and required mid system cleanings.  Perhaps the best place to get a feel for those events is the chronological event log.  Selected portions of my notes from the session are shown below:

Analysis:  

I do provide a technical analysis referencing State of Delaware Code, it’s reference to EAC specifications and Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSGs) but I thought I would just go with a common sense anecdotal statement and leave that technical stuff in an appendix. 

The tasks I measured and recorded are paper feeding and scanning.  That portion of the job is a whole lot like a copier.  If you had a copier that worked like this I would be willing to bet you would conclude that it is broken, doesn’t work and you would throw it away.  So that is what we observed. Unfortunately we as citizens have no idea how this machine tabulates ballots.  I would argue that neither does the DOE. We never audit the results, how would you know?  In one rare instance, we did have a re-count of an entire RD race in 2022.  In the re-count they were not able to find .48% of the ballots that the machines reported. That would have been all the machines, not just the Absentee and Early Vote.   As you watched the video and think of the description above do you now have any guesses why they couldn’t reconcile that count and where the problem might be?  Let me ask you a question.  Let’s say the way the State of Delaware operates and maintains, and tests these scanners, they do the “tabulation” part of the job every bit as good as they do the paper feed and scanning portion of the job.  Does that give you confidence in the Early and Absentee portion of our elections or quite the opposite?

Conclusions: 

In my opinion the observed performance relative my interpretation of industry standards is alarming.  To me the observations bring in to question the maintenance programs, and the logic and accuracy tests that are supposed to prevent performance like this.  Still, we are in the middle of an election.  To not use the machines is not an option. 

It is unconscionable that the State of Delaware, the DOE and the BOE have not performed risk post-election risk limiting audits on the Absentee and EarIy vote.  In past articles it was for different reasons.  Specifically the lack of audits would provide incentive for a cheater to implement electronic flipping or stuffing of the ballot box.  What was observed here adds a strong case for systemic process errors. 

Recommendations:

A significant portion of the vote has been processed already.  So what should we do.

Once again the recommendation is for the State of Delaware, the DOE and BOE to implement hand count audits of the Absentee and Early Vote ballots.  In past articles, I thought it would be reasonable to audit at the sample levels they use under Title 15, 5012A (c) for the “Day of In Person” machines, and that I believe they are required to do for the Early In Person and Absentee Vote.  Given the additional observations here, I now believe there should be a redundant hand count audit of ALL the Early In Person and Absentee vote.  I believe that this should be done prior to the certification of the election results as opposed to after the certification.

If you believe that is the case, reference this article and drop the Board of Election an email at: DE Board of Elections

Appendix: More Technical Arguments the Process has Failed.

Section § 5001A.  (c) of the code states that:

§ 5001A. A voting device or system purchased by the State must be certified by the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC), or designated federal authority, as meeting or exceeding the voluntary voting systems standards or guidelines (VVSGs)  as promulgated by the United States Election Assistance Commission, or designated federal authority, before delivery to and acceptance by the State.

While this language does not specify which VVSG Standard applies the standard for “error rate” provided in VVSG 1.1 will suffice for this analysis.  It states:

"All systems shall achieve a report total error rate of no more than one in 125,000 (8×10–6 )".   (.0008%)

When trying to ascertain what is an “error” VVSG standards define a failure as an event that results in:

1.  loss of one or more functions,

2.  degradation of performance resulting in a device that is unable to perform its intended function,

3.  automatic reset, restart, or reboot of the voting device, operating system or application software, requiring an unanticipated intervention by a person in the role of election worker or technician before normal operation can continue, or

4.  error messages or audit log entries indicating that a failure has occurred. failure rate Ratio of the number of failures that occur to the volume of data processed.

I would argue that when looking at the result from these machines we are looking at the result of 3 systems.  First the poll book printer prints the ballot, then the ballot marking device marks the ballot, and finally the scanner “Attempts” to scan the ballots.  If we accept that this is three sub-systems then the acceptable error rate stated above could be multiplied by 3.  You would have 3/ 125,000 or .0024%.

In the most forgiving argument, we could consider the “re-make” of the ballot the error.  The error rate would be 7/ 3220 or .21%.  This would be about 100x the acceptable error rate.  If we look at item 2 above we might consider “degradation of performance” and the “inability of the machine to perform its intended function on the first pass” as the appropriate rate.  That would put us at an error rate of 487/3320 = 15% or over 6,000x the acceptable error rate.  When one considers the jams, error messages, and multiple cleanings required that the operator invoked to try to make the situation better either of the above estimates of error rate would be lenient.

You might look the video and jump to the conclusion that the problem was only with the scanner on the right (station 4).  While many batches do have “less” rejects, than those for the two batches processed at station 4, the rejects jump right back up with new batches.  This would be consistent with, but not necessarily proof of, the problem being with the Early In Person machines that printed the ballots.

Another note.  When processing “Absentee Ballots” people often tend to blame the human voter for poor scanning performance.  “Oh the voter didn’t fill in the circle right and used check-marks or they spilled coffee on it”.  With Early In Person voting, a machine printed the activation card, a machine marked the candidate selections, department personnel, who are a part of “the system” handled the ballots in-between.  Very few human touches and yet we see the results in the video.

Before I get started, I would like to say what this article is NOT ABOUT.  I will be presenting data on the Ramone-Burns recount that occurred in the 2022 general election.  This article IS NOT about contesting the results.  Quite the contrary.  Since that race did have a hand count audit, I have more confidence in that result than others.  So this is not an article that puts the results of that race in question, but let’s look at the recount in a little more detail, and see what it does put in question.

The original results of the race were shown on the DOE Website and they were still there at the writing of this article. 

And you will also see that there that there was a re-count result.  I will only provide the summary portion.

So that is where the story begins.  The conventional “press” thought that the highlight of this data was that the NET difference, changed by 6 votes and that didn’t change the outcome, but nobody thought the NEON FLASHING LIGHT BURIED HEADLINE was important.  Have you figured it out yet?  Let me make it a little more obvious.

Look at the recount. The number of votes for both candidates went down. Department of Elections processes reported more votes cast and counted than The Board of Canvass was able to find to back-up that count. The total error was .48% or 42 ballots.

In June 2022, well before the election referenced above, I tried to report to the Board of Elections that there were significant vulnerabilities in our election systems.  They had no interest.  I further documented those issues, well before the 2022 election in an open letter to the board here: 9/22 Letter to BOE

Among other things I highlighted a huge vulnerability.  Specifically, the concern that the DOE does not perform publicly viewed post-election audits on our Absentee and Early vote.  I pointed this out BEFORE the race above. 

The result highlighted above was and is a FLASHING WARNING SIGN regarding our elections processes. Can we get any further insights regarding the problem(s)?

Cast Vote Records:

Cast Vote Records (CVRs) are files reported by the Election Management System.  Computer based voting systems are required to have them.  A snapshot component of what they look like, showing the columns for only one race is presented below.

The CVR’s provide a chronological order of the vote tally for a given election by machine.  These records provide vote results for each ballot, but do not provide any voter identity.  I selected a sample that includes an undervote, just so you could see an undervote.  Note that the CVR’s above are not sequential by increments of 1 because this list has been filtered to only include ballots associated with RD-21.  The sample above also only includes results for 1 race, but on any CVR row, there would also be the results of all the other races in additional columns.  One final note regarding CVR’s.  Although they are in chronological order, they do not provide an actual time stamp.  Given the CVR’s and a time stamped photo of a person entering a specific voting booth, you could still not tie a voting result to an individual.  This is why photos of people voting during the day are NOT sensitive.

By looking at the information provided in the “batch” column, you can segregate votes by type.  Results are shown below.

Again, with this exercise we are reminded that ballots are not votes.  Sometimes people don’t vote on a specific race and that results in an “undervote”.  Above we see how many pieces of paper (ballots) there should have been in each category.  In the articles referenced above I indicated particular concern in the Absentee and Early Vote categories.  Can we learn more?

The File of Absentee Voters:

The File of Absentee Voters (FOAV) is a file (list) that is required to be produced and distributed by the DOE.  Among other things this lists all the people that are on the permanent absentee list, and all the other people who aren’t on the permanent list, but that did request an absentee ballot.  It shows when the ballots were requested by the registrant, when they were sent out by the DOE, when they came back to the DOE and whether the ballot was accepted or rejected and why.  I obtained such a list for the 2022 election. 

The last ballot receipt on the update I had was recorded as of 11/7/22 3:29 PM.  The list would not have included any Absentee Ballots delivered after that time and through 11/8/22 which was the “Day of Election”.  Still, let’s see what we can learn from a review of the FOAV and then also pick up a few more gems from the CVR’s file.

            Working from top to bottom and referencing the line numbers in the table below 1)  We start with the total ballots received according to the FOAV and subtract 2.) the number of those that were rejected and we get 3.)  527 pieces of paper.  But this doesn’t account for any of the ballots that may have come in after 15:29 on the 7th.  The CVR’s showed that 4.) there were two lots of Absentee Ballots processed at the very end, and after all the Day of In Person voting results. Those two batches comprised 11 ballots.  I have assumed they were the ballots arriving after 3:29 pm on Monday.  After you add those back 5) you have 538 pieces of paper.  Finally, to get “votes” for the respective candidates, you subtract 6.) six undervotes reported for this race and 7.) one write-in vote. You get 8) a balance of 531 Absentee Votes that should have been cast and counted for the candidates.  But the DOE reported 9.) 544 Absentee Votes cast and counted, resulting in a difference of 13 shown on line 10.  So with the DOE’s own data, the numbers don’t appear to reconcile in the Absentee category.

I showed over two years ago, before the 2022 election that the vulnerability existed and that you couldn’t catch problems without audits.  How about that, we had a recount and it revealed a problem(s).  The non-reconciliation of the Absentee vote confirmed it was at least in one of the two vulnerable areas I had highlighted.  If the 13 ballot analysis holds, the error in number of ballots was 2.4% of the Absentee result.  If we apply that same percentage to the “Early Vote” in this race it would amount to 22 additional ballots for a total of 35.  That is NOT confirmed at this point but hypothetically that would be consistent with accounting for the lion’s share of the 42 ballot discrepancy.  Another note.  In this race, about 17% of the vote was Early or Absentee.   In some races that combined component of a race was over 40%.  What would the error level have been for those races?

The result could be that of simple non-nefarious systemic process error.  That said the exploitation of the vulnerability could be much worse than this example.  Electronic adding, or algorithmic flipping of votes could occur and you would never know it.  In 2022 these two components represented over 20% of the vote.  In 2020 with Covid in play it was above 30%.  You could flip 5% of the ballots for a 10% net difference in a race and without an audit you wouldn’t catch it. 

The primary job of the DOE is to provide an accurate count. The inability to balance the vote checkbook to within .48% caused alarm right?  Clearly they would understand the ramifications referenced above right? Clearly they would initiate investigations and studies and get to the bottom of it along with corrective actions right?   If that is the case, why did I take additional time and effort to pinpoint the Absentee Ballot concern?  Well, this is a concern only associated only with the DOE systems, and one that doesn’t involve the Board of Canvass at all.  You may see why that is important later. In general it’s simple. I didn’t see those expected responses from the Board, or the DOE. Did they have a concern, or curiosity, or accept any responsibility, or was their focus something else?

Below is an audio interaction between myself and Board Member Ms. Sandra Battaglia. We were talking about the recount at the BOE public meeting in February 2023.  This was discussed within a broader context of many process issues raised regarding the 2022 election, however, for this article I have selected a clip that references the recount presented above.  At the time of this discussion, I had not confirmed the suspected error in the Absentee portion of the vote, just the total difference between the two counts.

Audio Clip: Public Board Meeting: Dan Lesher/ Sandra Battaglia 2/2022 meeting.

It appears that Ms. Battaglia seemed to think I was questioning the decision of the Board of Canvass regarding the winner.  I was not.  I wasn’t even trying to show that vulnerabilities exist.  I had already done that in prior correspondence.  I was trying to show that the result, suggest that actual problems exist and that audit revealed that they exist, and that proves the value of audits.  I was trying to communicate that to the group responsible for those systems and apparently failed.

I am involved in the discussion so I may not be able to be objective so I ask the reader a few questions.  Did you think my concern was the result of the race, or that I was saying there was a nefarious conspiracy? Did Ms. Battaglia seem interested in any details or like she wanted to get to the bottom of things or did it seem to you more interested in taking the position that it was not their problem?  Did she display the kind of attitude and the curiosity level you want in the board that is supposed to be the watchdog over our election department and its’ systems? 

I would be the first person in line to say we should not judge a group or a person on a short edited clip.  But what about when you send the entire board and the Commissioner a letter in detail that suggests that they should audit Absentee and Early results not only because it is the right thing to do, but because it may also be required by code as I did here?  https://delawarecounts.com/p/post-election-audits-is-delaware  If they would ever address the questions or concerns with a counter analysis I may agree with them but they don’t.

Now, I understand that the DOE only has a multi-million dollar budget, with an Information Technology department and more. And I understand the 11 BOE members probably don’t get a huge stipend for phoning in to each meeting so maybe they just don’t have the resources to address security and quality control concerns associated with our elections. But wait, on the other hand, I have zero budget, I am one person with no stipend. I do know my way around an excel spreadsheet and have a friend or two that also don’t get paid but took some initiative to get some CVR’s. So it is not resources. Why have they not even acknowledged these issues that could impact the quality control of over 20% of the vote? 

Maybe that’s it. I am just one person.  There are very few of us who go to BOE meetings. Maybe it’s as simple as that.  Maybe they think if nobody else cares about what I / we are saying why should they.  I think and hope that many people are concerned about election integrity but maybe they don’t have anything specific they can point to for a tangible action item.  If you agree with the concerns of this article now you do. 

Myself and others have fought for over 9 months to get the Board of Elections to put an email address on their website.  They finally did.  That email address is StateBoardOfElections@delaware.gov.  If you believe that the post-election audit of the Absentee and Early vote is important and you want the BOE and DOE to do that, please drop them a note and let them know.  Feel free to copy me on that note at delawarecounts@protonmail.com.  Better yet, attend the next board meeting in person or by phone and register your concerns in the public comment section.  Thank you for your consideration and help in advance.

Delaware Update

Whether you are a candidate, a door knocking volunteer or a phone caller, in some ways you are a salesperson trying to get a particular message across.  People may be happy to hear from you and want to talk with you.  That’s great.  In that situation there might still be an opportunity to enhance or extend that positive interaction with an Election Integrity Question.

On the other hand, a lot of people are busy.  You may have just interrupted dinner.  They may have to get the kids to the next event.  He or she may need to finish cutting the lawn.  In those cases you might be getting “the blank stare”, or that “polite smile”.   They are not engaged and are looking for an opportunity to exit.  In this case you are not yet in the game.  Can an Election Integrity Question get you in the game?

People may not be interested in general politics, or topics that seem distant, but may be VERY interested in things they don’t know “ABOUT THEIR OWN HOME”.   So what kind of question might we want to ask that could potentially surface such information and get them interested? How about something like this:

Example:  Thank you for your time and for this opportunity to have met.  Before I go I have one more question.  My registered voters list here shows 4 more people other than yourself currently registered at this address.   Is that true, (optional) and if so, may I leave a pamphlet for each of them too? (Obviously use the correct number where I have inserted 4 above.)

Potential Responses:   If they say yes that is correct, then great.  You have verified that the voter roll is correct and you have, or have not, been provided another opportunity to get your message across by leaving your pamphlet(s) behind.  But what if you get different responses.  Something like:

1.  Registrant:  No, you have the right phone number, but I don’t live there anymore.  I now live at (New Address and State).  (Triggers Form 1:  Registrant Form).

2.  Resident/ Close Relatives:  No, it’s just me and my husband now.  Those other two names are our kids and they moved out years ago.  That’s our girl and she lives in _________ and that is our boy and he lives in _________.   (Triggers two of Form 2:  Close Relative Form)

3.  Non-Relative:  No, I (do, or don’t) know who they are and I (do or don’t) know where they live now, but I can assure you that they don’t live here.  And oh, by the way I am sick and tired of still getting their darn mail here too.  (Triggers Form 3:  Non-Relative Form)

Given this information you might now be able help them fix a problem they didn’t even know they had.

So What Next?  Well how about something like this?

Oh wow that’s interesting.   I have a couple of forms here Link: Three Forms (or email to them if on phone) that can help you fix that. You can fill them out and email them to the appropriate address at the bottom of form the when you get a chance. I’m also going to leave you a Little Card Link: Little Card shows a few reasons it may be important.

Note:  (Important):  While some of the forms I am providing are DOE forms, neither I or anyone associated with this effort are with the DOE or any government agency. I am just a volunteer.   Finally, it is not necessary, but if you are willing, when you email the form to the DOE, would you consider copying the email address that is on the “Little Card”.   That might allow some volunteers to follow-up in bulk to try to see if corrections are being made and other integrity efforts.

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Note:  At the State Fair, in a sample of less than 50 people the largest number of “extra” registrants as stated by the sole tenant occupant was 4.  Yep, 4 “EXTRA” Names at one address 

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What you should know before you knock or call!

Whether you are walking or calling, and whether you are working from a paper list or electronic “app”, at a minimum you should glance at the list for 10-15 seconds and try to be aware of a few following before the call or knock.  Here are the items and the reasons why:

1.  Number of Names Registered at That Address:  A list sorted by street and street number will put all registrants at a single residence in subsequent rows. A glance at the list makes the answer to that easy. Notice I said number of names, and not voters!  Yes, the number of names is the total.  That total number of names could be comprised of.  1.1. Valid Registered Voters.   1.2  Errors on the list.  On my own lists, I have uncovered about 9% suspected errors.  Based on anecdotal evidence I would expect higher rates higher turnover situations such as apartments student rentals.

2.  Number of different Last names:  A frequent “indicator” of a “potential” error, is two or more different “last” names at an address.  While this alone may not be a problem, it is consistent with a residence being sold from one family to another, or perhaps just former and current tenants. 

3.  Ages of Each Person:  A frequent error in the voter rolls involves the situation where a “child” moved out of the “parents” house.  By looking at the ages and last names, you might be able to deduce parent/ child relationship, and whether the children are of an age that they might have moved out, or alternatively the parents are of such an age that it makes sense that they are living with an adult child.

“Note”:  Your walk list or “App” should have estimate of AGE, not Birth Date, or Birth Year.  You may have 15 seconds and don’t need to be fooling around with addition and subtraction for 5 people at the residence.  Get the “AGE” added to your lists.  It’s easy.   

4.  The First Names:  These “may” give you an indication of gender, and with that and all above, you may have a good guess as to who you are talking to immediately (Father, Mother, Son, Daughter).  You might want to guess a name. Hello, are you by chance Robert?  Even if you guessed wrong, the response might lead to information.  Oh no, he doesn’t live here anymore……

5.  Inactive or Active:  If a name is marked inactive there is a high probability that person does not live there anymore.  While it would be possible to initiate a form it may not be worth the time because there are other integrity solutions that can be employed to address inactive situations.   

6.  NCOA and Low Propensity Columns:  On my lists I provide I have columns that show if a person is shown to have moved out of state according to the National Change of Address database provided by the post office (NCOA).  I also indicate whether the person has not voted in the last 2, or even last 3 elections.

A “1” in any of these columns would indicate either:  6.1 ) A high probability that the person is no longer living at that address, or 6.2)  You have found the elusive “low propensity voter” that all candidates want to convert.   I do not provide the pitch as to how to convert them, just the observation that you should know there might be one or more at that address before you knock or call and have that pitch ready to go.

In my opinion the above is the minimum information that you should have available at a glance.  Again you might want to take a 10-15 second glance before you knock or call so you can be aware of high probability situations.

Two Additional Tools:  Believe it or not we are almost finished, but there are two more tools of which you might want to be aware.  

What’s the Best Way to Vote in Delaware?  If you start talking election integrity, this question may come up.  It is not necessarily a simple quick answer.  Here is a link to an article that discusses this topic if you want to be prepared for a discussion.

https://delawarecounts.com/p/whats-the-best-method-to-vote-in

If there is no time you might just want to leave a handout.  Here is a single page (2 sides) you might want to carry with you that you can leave behind that provides a more in depth discussion of the voting methods and benefits and concerns associated with each. Link Best Method .docx

Voter Registration Information:  When talking about elections, voter registration may naturally come up.  You might want to be prepared for those types of questions also.

So that is it, believe it or not we are done.  Let’s review the Implementation. 

1.  15 Second Review:   Glance at your list regarding the key information so you aware of high probability opportunities before you make contact.

2.  Make the call, and at the end, ask the question:   “I show that there are X people living here and registered to vote at this address.  Is that correct? 

3.  Upon getting a response, offer help and get them one or more of the “Three
Forms”, the “Little Card”, or other materials as appropriate.

That's it.  I hope this helps and good luck with all of your efforts.

Hey everyone, the Department of Elections (DOE) just sent out “Election Special Notice” cards.  Woo-hoo!  Wait!  Uh-oh, let’s say you just got one or more of those cards in your mail and it is addressed to a person(s) who doesn’t live at your address.  It could be a son or daughter who are no longer there, or someone you don’t even know.  One such card is shown above.  If you get that kind of a card, what are some options you may want to consider to try to get the situation corrected, and thereby reduce the chances of anyone ever being accused of an election fraud situation associated with your address.

Option 1.  Do what the Card Suggests?  The card suggests that you write “Not at this Address” across the top and drop it back in the mail box.  I WOULD RECOMMEND YOU NOT DO THIS….. or at least not do just this.  Why?

This action will “likely” result in the DOE implementing what is generically referred to as “The Post Card Process”.  That is covered under Section 1704 of Title 15.  That and all other code references in this article are shown at the link here:

https://delcode.delaware.gov/title15/c017/index.html

Removal Procedures

While it can yield some near term results, it can also take over 4 years to get an error corrected on the voter rolls.

Option #2:  Fill out a form, and then email that to the DOE:  As a fellow citizen and acting only in that capacity, I would recommend doing this option 2. 

Why?  If the DOE or Board of Elections (BOE) gets one of the forms they “may” be able to correct the voter roll immediately.  A link to download 3 forms is provided here: Three Forms.  An actual “Form 3” that was submitted to the DOE along with a copy of the “Error Card” is shown below.

The submission got a response from the DOE.  At this point I am not sure as to whether the response is appropriate or not.   The response with my comments and one concern are presented below.  If after sending form 3, you get a similar response I would suggest you do Option #1 too!  Maybe two chances to get corrections.

Why might we get a faster and more correct response if one of the three forms is appropriate?  We can see this by looking at brief description of the forms and reviewing certain sections of the code.

Form 1:  Registrant Form:  A registrant, under section 1707 of the code may provide permission to have his or her name removed from the voter roll.  Form 1, created by the State provides a convenient means for a registrant to provide written notice and communicate that permission.  If you know the person formerly residing at your residence you may want to forward this form to them and let them address the situation, however, if they take no action, there still may be an error on the voter roll associated with your residence.

Form 2:  The Close Relative Form:  Under sections 1705 and 1707, a spouse, adult child, sibling or parent (Close Relatives) may provide written notice to report an out of state move or death.  Form #2 created by the State provides a convenient means for these Close Relatives to provide that written notice.

Form 3:  Non-Relative Form:  Under sections 1702, the Board of Elections, given a valid reason, may remove a registrant’s name from the voter roll.  Under section 1708 a DOE employee with approval of a supervisor may “correct errors” in the voter rolls.  Unfortunately the State has not provided a form that would conveniently facilitate a citizen with means of providing written notice to the DOE or BOE that such situations exist, such as the incorrect address/ name combination the DOE has memorialized on the special notice cards.  While no “form” is required to provide a written notice, I have created form 3 to hopefully facilitate such communication.

(Note:  I was not able to find explicit references in this section of the code to classifications other than the stated “Close Relatives” and “Registrant”. However, under section 1707 and using Form 1, a former resident could unilaterally act to have his name quickly removed from the voter roll.  Now, regarding residency, is there anyone who would argue that current owner / occupant, citizen resident has a lesser right than the former occupant to provide written notice that that the former resident name is no longer a resident at that address and have that situation corrected quickly?)

Additional Information and Survey:

I did more research on the particular name and became more concerned what my findings may reveal about our election systems.  Maybe I am overly concerned.  I would like to know what you think. 

1.  Fast People Search:  This source showed a person of the same name, and of the same age, and having a reference phone number the same as the one on the Delaware voter roll. This source indicates the person has a current address in PA.

2.  The PA Voter Roll:  The State of Pennsylvania, provides “notification” to the world, which includes Delaware, as to who is registered to vote in PA. It does this by publishing its voter rolls.  This information is available for $20.  A volunteer cross referenced information on the DE voter rolls to that on the PA rolls.

The PA rolls show a person of same name and age as registered to vote in PA.  While the “PA Registration Address” does not agree with the persons “Current Address” as reported in reference 1, it does agree with a prior PA address reported in reference 1.  The PA voter roll shows a PA registration date in 2016, and a vote in 2020.

3.  Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC).  Delaware and Pennsylvania are members of this organization.  This organization states that it provides member states with “list maintenance reports”  one of which is a Cross State Movers Report: which utilizes voter registration data, and MVD data.

Citizen Survey:  What do you think?

If you want to reply, you don’t need to fill out the form if you don’t want you could just send me an email with the 3 answers to dlesher3@comcast.net.   That’s all for this post.  Thank you for reading and your consideration regarding the recommendations for cleaning up the voter rolls.

Post Election Audits:  Absentee and Early Voting

1.  Introduction:  I am concerned that the Department of Elections (DOE), in carrying out elections, may have operated outside the letter, and/ or intent of Delaware law.  Regardless of whether they have broken the law or not, I am concerned that the DOE is implementing elections in a way that de-facto, results in a situation that all Early and Absentee ballots, circumvent a critical quality control test.

2.  Subject Issue:   The topic of this post is the “post-election” hand count audits of Absentee and Early Vote ballots.  I am concerned that audits of the Absentee and Early Vote ballots that I believe may be required by law were not performed.  If it is deemed they are not required by law there would still be the question of professional judgment of those involved.

3.  Significance:  Why is this significant? 

1.  In 2022, over 20% of the vote used the Absentee and Early methods.  In 2020 the Absentee and Mail-In vote, with processing similar to 2022, was over 30%.

2.  The Logic and Accuracy Tests, that are supposed to be designed to ensure that the machines are programmed properly, in my opinion can not achieve that objective. The the test can be beat by the most trivial of algorithms which would be “Improper Programming”.  If post-election audits are not performed on a portion of the system it both incentivizes “bad actors” to infiltrate our systems by using such algorithms as they are the easiest and most efficient way to cheat with least chance of getting caught.  I make that case here and show how it is done on a working machine so you can judge for yourself as to whether that is the case.

https://delawarecounts.com/p/introducing-the-cheat-o-matic-100k

3.  Relevant Code / Practice:  Why do I argue that the DOE, in practice, may be operating outside the letter and intent of the law.  There are 3 reasons

3.1  5012 A: Audits:  In practice, the Absentee and Early Vote Ballots have not been subjected to section 5012 A, (c) (1) and (2) audits.

An extract of the referenced language is below (highlights mine).

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1) The Department shall audit all results of 1 randomly selected election district in each county and 1 randomly selected election……………

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While the code states that all results of the selected districts shall be audited, in practice ONLY the machines that process the “Day of In Person” ballots for those districts have been subject to audit.  This can be confirmed by reviewing audit results and also has been stated at such audits by DOE personnel.

Chapter 50A of Title 15, is titled Electronic Voting Systems .  It does not limit itself to just the systems for one method of voting.  Chapter 54:  Early Voting, and Chapter 55:  Absentee Voting do not specify any requirements for post-election audits and they don’t need to as the requirement is addressed in Chapter 50A.  To argue that is not the case would be tantamount to argue that it was the intent of the legislature to have over 20% of the vote circumvent a critical QC audit.

3.2.  Administrative Code Audits:  The State of Delaware and the DOE and BOE have accepted there is an increased vulnerability of the Absentee Method of Voting.  In Delaware’s Administrative Code: Section 15: Elections you will find section 200 Security and Integrity of the Absentee Voting Process.  At the end you will see section 10.3 and 10.4  I have copied section 10.3 below for convenience.

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10.3 The Department shall audit the General Election Absentee Results for at least 3% of the Election Districts after February 1 in the year following a General Election and report the results to the Board of Elections for New Castle County.

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While the Administrative Code appears to reference the New Castle County Board of Elections, you can see from section 203 of Title 15: that the State Board of Elections inherited all duties that were previously those of the prior county boards so it would seem that this law should still be current.

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§ 203. State Board of Elections; powers and duties.

There is hereby established a State Board of Elections, which shall have all of the powers and duties previously vested in the Board of Elections for New Castle County, the Board of Elections for Kent County, and the Board of Elections for Sussex County, as well as such other powers and duties as set forth in this title.

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The reason I have concern that DOE may have operated outside law regarding this item is the response I got to a recent FOIA request which is shown in exhibit A.  This reply is consistent with, but perhaps not proof, that the audit was not performed, or report delivered.

4.  Remedy/ Logistics:  The remedy requested is to perform both audits referenced above in 3.1 and 3.2.  I assume that the audits of the Absentee and Early ballots will flow as a natural extension from the“random selections” of machines and ED’s currently performed for the “Day of In Person” machines. I have witnessed the audits performed by the DOE and have discovered vulnerabilities.  In interests of keeping this letter brief I will recommend procedures that should help eliminate those vulnerabilities and address logistics of incorporating the Absentee and Early vote Ballots also.  The recommendations are in Exhibit B below.

Exhibit A:  FOIA RESPONSE

1.  Introduction:

In presentations, I have expressed concerns regarding a GAPING HOLE in QUALITY CONTROL with respect to our elections in Delaware.  Specifically, we do not perform publicly viewed, post-election, Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs) on our systems that process our Absentee and Early Vote ballots.  Based on 2022 results, that means over 20% of our vote is not subject to this critical quality control step.  This makes our systems more vulnerable to a specific type of algorithmic cheating I will lightly refer to as The Old Fliparoo.  This class of algorithms provides “bad actors” one of the Easiest and Most Efficient Means of Rigging an Election, while at the same time providing them With the Least Chance of Actually Getting Caught if they can infiltrate. To those who say we are protected a story comes to mind. God told the Lobster I have good news and bad news. The good news is I have given you a hard shell and claws for great protection. The bad news is I also made you the tastiest morsel in the ocean. Without RLA’s the Fliparoo….is the tastiest morsel in the ocean.

 I have also argued that Logic and Accuracy Tests that are required to ensure the systems are programmed properly…. can’t actually do that. This time, I don’t say it. I show it. It’s no longer hypothetical.  I give you a working voting system that does it….right in front of you.

The machine provided comes with all the functionality needed for the cheater.  If you open the file and play with the machine, 1.)  You will get to be the Voter and “Cast your Vote”.  2.)  You will be able to play the roll of the Department of Elections.  You will be able to “design the ballot”, and “reset the election”.  3.)  You also get to play the role of a notorious cheater and input in the parameters that allow you to both, “Pass” the DOE’s Logic and Accuracy Test, and then implement the steal, so your candidate wins.  4.)  Finally, you can be one of those integrity guys, or alternatively the QC guy for the cheater and review the “Cast Vote Records”.  In doing so you may either get clues as to whether something strange happened in the election or if the machine is cheating properly as designed depending on your perspective.  Finally you’ll get to see the Improper Programming that vendors won’t let you see. If you poke around the “Developers” tab you can find it in the Excel file.

It is not necessary to open and play with the machine as the article stands alone with “screen shots” and the description of operation but it is not nearly as fun.  I hope this expands your understanding of the problems, and illustrates what needs, and can be done to fix the problem, now.

2.  Introducing:  The Cheat-O-Matic 100K (DE):  Election System!

2.1  Project Scope: 

So you think creating an election system is a big expensive complex task right?   Ughhhh….no.  In the big world of computers, election math and the concept of adding 1 to a prior total is pretty small potatoes.  I told a buddy I wanted to create a voting “system” with certain algorithmic cheating capabilities.  I said just do it in an “Excel” workbook, because Excel is one of the most widely used programs on earth.  From the time of verbal specification to actual product, about an hour.  You could stretch it to 1.5 hrs if you include chit-chat between two friends on the phone.  I owe him a beer.  Better yet Excel programming is his business and he can do from very simple to very complex system work.  If you need such work, let me know and I will get you his contact information.

2.2  The Program: 

The program itself is attached as part of this article.  If you have Excel on your computer you can open and play with it a bit and become an election systems “expert”.  It’s a real powerhouse. It does one race with two candidates.  It does use a “macro” so if Excel asks for approval when you open it… you have to say yes.  Disclaimer:  Now, I don’t want me or my friend to get into one of those “no good deed goes unpunished” situations so how about a legal disclaimer.  I think it works right, and I don’t think it has any bugs or worms but neither he or I warrant a damn thing.  Use it for fun and education at your own risk. The link to the file is here: The Cheat-O-Matic

2.3  The Interface(s)

The entire set of interface(s) for 1.) The Voter,  2.) The Department of Elections, and the 3) The Cheater including operator instructions and a friendly reminder to the Cheater are shown in this screenshot that is Exhibit A.

 3.2  Total Votes Cast:

In the real election systems, the “Total Votes Cast” shown as “26” above for the Cheat-O-Matic will show up all throughout the day for a certain geography on the “Electronic Poll Books” and each machine.  The election workers can see that.  The “Challengers” can see that. By the way, you cheaters that are worried about the slick Challengers out there who are going to count the number of people that enter the polling location and to see if it matches Total Votes cast….don’t worry, when you do The Old Fliparoo, ballots aren’t added or subtracted, just flipped so this number will be correct and it won’t get caught.

At the central systems accessible by the DOE they can not only see the total votes cast throughout the state but they also know the party and name of each voter credited as casting a vote by any method up to that point in time.  In theory nobody is supposed to know which candidate each voter voted for and no such aggregate totals are supposed to be available until after the polls close.

During an election, the DOE provides this “have voted” data to the political parties.  One narrative used to justify this practice is that the parties can use the information to try to “Get Out The Vote” (GOTV).  Volunteers can call, txt or otherwise try to contact people that up to that point in time have not cast a vote.  While that may be the accepted narrative, as a public service announcement, the folks at Cheat-O-Matic point out that such data might coincidentally provide cheaters a good estimate of how many votes, if any, they might need to steal the “win” for their candidate(s).

3.3  Recorded Votes: 

In a “normal” election you will not see any individual “candidate” results during the day.  After the polls close they will let you see the “Recorded Votes”.  On Exhibit A these are highlighted in red.  For the individual “Day of In Person” voting machines, the candidate Recorded Vote summaries will be printed out on paper register tapes after the polls close.  Many such tapes are hung in the windows of the voting locations.

3.4 Actual Votes:  Real voting machines do not have a function like the Cheat-O-Matics  “Actual Votes” display highlighted in Green.  I think that is very inconsiderate and just not very consumer friendly.  If they did, everything would be so easy but real machines only report the Recorded Votes.  Now, if there are Risk Limiting Audits……..and to the extent of the sample size of the audits,…… and to the extent the audits are robust and can’t be beat by cheaters……and pending the actual results of the audits……you may have “some” confidence that the Recorded Votes = Actual Votes.  I mean I sorta think that’s the whole idea behind those publicly viewed RLA’s.

3.5 The Department of Elections (DOE) Tasks:

The DOE has an important tasks to perform in an election. On the Cheat-O-Matic the DOE performs two.

3.5.1  Design the Ballot:  They need to write the name of the actual candidates where it says “Candidate A” and “Candidate B”.  If you “right click” with the cursor on those buttons they will be “selected” and you can both edit the candidate’s name or move the location of the buttons.  Have you figured it out yet?  As it sits, the cheating program is designed to “flip” votes from Candidate A, the candidate on the left side of the ballot, to Candidate B on the right side of the ballot. By reversing the location of the buttons and changing names you could flip votes from the candidate on the right to the candidate on the left. 

Now you cheaters this can be useful in a different way. If you know your candidate is getting crushed in the polls you don’t even need to turn on The Old Fliparoo. By relabeling names and changing the position you could just have all Recorded Votes for Candidate B votes be counted for Candidate A or vice versa just by the design of the Ballot. You wouldn’t need a flipping algorithm at all. (Caution, this method of cheating could be discovered in the LAT if the public show up and you don’t know how to rig the test deck). Worried about getting caught.  No problem.  If people discover “incorrect” labeling remember, incorrect is subjective.  I think if you say some technical jargon like, “oopsie”, “glitch”, “human-error” there will be no problems, just don’t blame the machines. Blaming the machines can get you in trouble.  OK, if you are done playing with those buttons you did it.  You just “designed the ballot”. 

Note: While the Cheat-O-Matic is an “In Person” voting device, in real systems the DOE also has to “Design the Ballot” for the machines that scan the Absentee and Early Ballots too.

3.5.2  Reset Election  The DOE has another important job with the Cheat-O-Matic.  They push the button that says “Reset Election”.  When that happens all the numbers on Exhibit A, and the table in worksheet tab named “Cast Vote Records” (see below) get “cleared” and you are ready for the next election.  Go ahead.  Press the button and feel the power.  All the information is gone along with the hopes and dreams of those pesky Election Integrity folks trying to figure out anomalies in the data and pushing for audits.  That’s it, push the button and squash-em like bugs.  In real systems, the information from past elections has been found to remain on the systems.

3.6.  The Cheater:

The Cheater Interface is the section below the yellow line.  The Cheat-O-Matic, features the “Date-Time Trigger/ Flip” algorithm.  The cheater can to input two cheating parameters.  They define:  1.)  The Date and Time the cheating should start (Date/ Time Trigger) and 2.) the rate at which the votes get taken away from Candidate A and given to Candidate B (Flipped).  You can see below that for the election shown, the cheating shouldn’t have started until 11:30 AM on 7/27/24, and once the cheating started, it should have Flipped every 3^rd vote cast for Candidate A to Candidate B. 

***UPGRADE NOTICE**** V2.0: In response to its valued cheating stakeholders demands, Cheat-O-Matic is working on a version 2.0.  That improved version will not only have a “Reset Election” button but will also add a “Close Election” button.  It turns out the stakeholders are a bit sensitive to the fact that the “Cheating Interface” and the “Actual Vote” report are right there out in the open for all to see.  Now for some odd reason they also don’t like those things even being visible any time after the ballots stop being counted.  We at Cheat-O-Matic aim to please, so in the new version the “Actual Vote “ register, and the “Cheating Interface” will be moved to a new tab titled “Legal Terms and Conditions”, to discourage the wrong people from going there during the critical time of use.  Also, when you press the new “Close Election” button the “The Cheating Interface” and “Actual Votes” report will be “cleared” as if they weren’t even there.  Don’t worry, when you press the “Reset Election” button they will come right back again and be ready for use for the right people. 

3.7.  The Logic and Accuracy Test: Reminder   Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha.  No really, that’s pretty funny!  Oh wait, you were serious…you mean you really don’t know?

The Cheat-O-Matic provides the Cheaters with a friendly reminder regarding the Logic and Accuracy Test (LAT).  Most, if not all real Departments of Elections run Logic and Accuracy Tests.  These are demonstrations that are designed to ensure that the machines operate correctly, and that they are programmed properly.  If they don’t pass the test they shouldn’t be used.  This test can be viewed by the public. 

A portion of the stated Delaware legal code (Title 15) relating to the Logic and Accuracy test for the equipment used in processing the Absentee and Early Vote ballots is presented below.

§ 5523. Logic and accuracy testing of absentee ballot tabulating equipment; authority of the State Election Commissioner.

(a) The State Election Commissioner, in consultation with the Department offices, shall promulgate rules and regulations relating to logic and accuracy testing of absentee ballot tabulating machines.

(b) Rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to this section shall ensure that:

(1) All machines are thoroughly tested immediately following maintenance and programming thereof to determine whether:

a. The voting system is properly programmed;

Now the Cheat-O -Matic provides a friendly reminder for the Cheaters, to set the “Start Cheating” time to a time that is both after the DOE LAT but before the close of the polls during the election. If the cheating is turned on after the LAT the machine will pass the LAT and the Improper Programming present in the Cheat-O-Matic, will not be revealed. Since the Date and Time of the LAT are published by the DOE well in advance this is not a problem. Obviously, the date/time trigger also needs to be set to either just before the election starts or certainly well before the polls close so it can do its job, flip votes, and you know, cheat…..duhhhh.

4. The State of Delaware Conundrum: While I am having fun here with expressing the perspective of the cheater, let me get back to bering serious for just a moment. I would argue, the State of Delaware may have a problem. You see the legislature has indicated that the LAT shall ensure that “the voting system is properly programmed.” Now that we know how the Cheat-O-Matic works, and that the algorithm would not be turned on to function at the time the LAT is performed, it is clear that the Cheat-O-Matic or any such equipment infected with similar “Improper Programming” would PASS the test. This no longer hypothetical or “in theory”. You have a real working machine in front of you where flips are turned on at a certain time and you can watch it happen.

It can be argued that the DOE has failed in its duty to design a test that can ensure that the voting system is “properly programmed” and therefore if that is recognized it should not be allowed to be used. Now we have another part of the law (not shown) that says we must use the machines. So if we have a part of the law that says we can’t use the machines, and another part that says we must, we have a conundrum. Well just fix the damn test. It’s obvious right? Wrong. It’s actually worse. You can’t design a test that achieves the intent of the legislature and you will see why when I show the actual “Improper Programming” and discuss “Proprietary” software below.

Certifications? Now some will say, wait, we have “certifications”. When our systems were delivered they met EAC standards. When we checked that the software was the right version and we ran a diagnostics we “certified” the machine before use. While that is nice, it is also IRRELEVANT. We don’t want to rely on the certification of a vendor to ensure our elections. We rely on our DOE and by oversight, the Board of Elections (BOE) to do that. Also, let’s consider whether that is a naïve statement? Don’t you think the vendors are smart enough to have their excuses and lawyers ready? I can just imagine the response from a vendor if “Improper Programming” was discovered, or its presence revealed by audit. The response might go something like this. Hey we gave you perfectly good machines as certified by the EAC. Look, that sticker proves it. We can’t speak to how or when any nefarious programming got there. We’ve admitted in court there is no possible 100% guarantee against being infiltrated or hacked. That could have happened right after the last certification, or the LAT. That is not our problem. We recommended, we told you, that you should implement audits to confirm proper operation so YOU, not US, could certify YOUR elections. We can’t help it if you didn’t do that or worse yet, that you didn’t recognize the vulnerability and didn’t know how to address it. Oh, and if you say it’s our fault we will sue you.

5. IMPROPER PROGRAMMING?

So did the legislators at least have the right concept in mind when they were worried about ensuring proper programming? I mean what does IMPROPER PROGRAMMING look like? Is it complex? Does it look like pages and pages of Egyptian hyroglifics? Do you need years and years of training in computer coding? Well, let’s take a look at the “IMPROPER PROGRAMMING present in the Cheat-O-Matic. It is shown in Exhibit B below. I will not go into go into the detail of the code but will make a few observations:

5.1. Non-Proprietary Code: The Cheat-O-Matic uses non-proprietary code. That’s why I can show it to you above. That is not typically the case. Real voting machine companies argue and make contract requirements that neither the DOE or the State can have access. Even if you understood and knew how to look for Improper Programming, you couldn’t do it if you wanted to. If that’s the case, given what we have now learned about the LATs, it can be argued that the State’s, the BOE’s and the DOE’s ONLY real tool left for assurance of the integrity of our elections are the RLA’s, and so far to me it looks like for the Absentee and Early Vote…we don’t do em.

5.2.  Entire Code:  The entire code for the Cheat-O-Matic, both the proper and IMPROPER programming fit on about ½ page and the entire width of this page isn’t even used.  I just looked online as to when kids start to learn computer coding these days.  This is probably in the realm of what many kids grade 8 or higher could do as a project if so inclined.  Again, this took a skilled programmer about 1 hour to write after a verbal specification. 

5.3.  Two-Subroutines :  The first section titled “Sub CastVote() is the “subroutine” code that is invoked when the Voter clicks the “Cast Vote” button.  The section that starts with “Sub Clear Data” is the code invoked when the Department of Elections presses the “Reset Election” button.

5.4.  IMPROPER PROGRAMMING:  The last part is a “function” called “Flip”.  That programming, and any programming that references that function are “IMPROPER PROGRAMMING and highlighted in RED.  There it is.  It’s real.  It’s a tangible thing.  You can point to it.

UPGRADE NOTICE: *******V3.0: While he was reading a draft of this article and the note regarding V2.0 above, my buddy, ughh I mean the Cheat-O-Matic development department, indicated he can make the actual cheating programming code go away with the press of the Close Election button and bring it back with the Reset Election button. Easy peasy.

5.5.  Context:  The entire programming code for the Cheat-O-Matic is 28 KB worth of memory.  The “word” document for this article, while also tiny, take up about 10X that space.  Vendors now have storage drives that look exactly like the “dongle” that you use for your wireless keyboard that hold 20,000 X this amount of memory.  They cost $1.89.  This code is so small, you could put it in as a part of any other program, or thumb drive, and if you didn’t know where or how to look, it would be like looking for a needle in a haystack.

6.  Cast Vote Records:

The Cheat-O-Matic has another feature that can help for quality control.  It has “Cast Vote Records” (CVRs).  Look at the second tab in the workbook with that name.  Real election machines are required by law to have these too and the real format of those is specified in detail.  The format of the CVR’s in the Cheat-O-Matic don’t meet the official legal specifications but by reviewing them, and reviewing how they are added to the table each time you press the “Cast Vote” button when voting you will get the idea.  The CVR’s remain on the system until the Reset Election button is pressed.  The CVR’s for the election I ran with the cheating inputs of Exhibit A, are shown in Exhibit C.

6.1  The Privacy of Your Vote and Cameras at Polling Locatons:

The CVR table shows the sequential recording of the votes with a time stamp.  While the CVR’s above are only for 1 voting machine, the CVR’s for a larger systems can be identified down to the machine.  A CVR “shouldn’t” have a “Voter ID” or a voters name attached as the persons vote would then no longer be secret. 

There is some confusion as to use of cameras in a polling location.  In my opinion the lack of understanding of the CVR’s is why.  If you had a video, or photo with a time stamp that could associate a person, a time, and machine, then by adding the CVR you could then find out how that person voted.  That would not be good.  Now, on the other hand, if you need a camera to document a problem with the election equipment, or take a photo of a written note log that you turned in to your inspector and that he signed so you could keep for your records, or video the response of an “official” at crunch time, and the photo will not connect a voter, to a time and a machine I don’t see a problem.  Such documentation should be allowed and encouraged, and the DOE, Poll Workers, and Challengers should be trained in these fine points regarding cameras.

6.2  Quality Control and Analysis Value of CVR’s:

So what can we learn from the CVR’s? Examination of the Cheat-O-Matic CVR’s confirm that the Improper Programming was present and it worked exactly as designed so the cheating stakeholders should be happy. You can see that at times before the Date-Time Trigger, no votes were flipped and for each CVR the Actual Vote was the same as the Recorded Vote.  After the time trigger, the votes were flipped at the proper rate.  Every 3^rd actual vote for Candidate A was flipped to a recorded vote for candidate B and those are highlighted in yellow.  What a shame, in Actual Votes it was a tie but we know Actual Votes don’t count.  With the help of The Old Fliparoo, three actual votes were flipped resulting in a swing impact of 6 votes. The Recorded Votes reflect a 61% / 39% blowout for Candidate B.

A final technical note regarding the Cheat-O-Matic.  This looks more like an “In Person” voting machine.  Yes, that is correct but recall, all the Early Voting is on such “In Person” machines, and it should be obvious that the similar Improper Programming code could reside on machines that scan, or the central systems that report the “Recorded Votes”. 

7.  Proper Respect to Candidate A:  What a Sport:  Now before we move to solutions, can we get a nice round of applause for Candidate A.  It’s the Delaware Way!  This candidate should be well respected as he/she takes the losers seat in the carriage ride, or walks right next to the righteous winning Candidate B in the “Bury the Hatchet” parade in Georgetown DE after the election.  We’re so civil here.  There is no shame at all.  Come back and try again Candidate A.  Maybe do more door knocking next time. Maybe do more fund raising next time. Maybe do more registrations of voters next time. Maybe do more Get Out the Vote next time.  All those things are great things to do BUT BEWARE if there are cheaters present, maybe even just one cheater for the Old Fliparoo, please know that they love it when you do those things.  They love it when you spend cherished resources doing ANYTHING BUT THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT COULD PREVENT THEM FROM CHEATING!  So candidates, what are you doing to prevent cheaters from cheating? Are you pushing for audits? Are you helping to clean the voter rolls as you door knock? Are you taking the right forms with you when you door knock?

8.  SO WHAT ARE SOLUTIONS?:

An obvious long-term solution is to get rid of the machines and do hand counts.  Maybe that can be done in the future but as stated, our current laws “may” have us in a conundrum.

8.1.  Voters:  Maybe Consider Having YOUR Ballot AVOID The Old Fliparoo.

I argue that The Fliparoo, would be more likely be found in the systems that process the Absentee and Early Vote ballots due to the lack of the RLA’s so why not just vote in person?  That could work!  With that said I only talk about one vulnerability to our election systems in this article.  If you want to really consider the best way to vote check here:  https://delawarecounts.com/p/whats-the-best-method-to-vote-in

8.2  BOE/ DOE?:  While one part of the legal code requires that we use the machines, there is no part of the code that says we can’t do hand counts too!  We don’t need new laws.  There is Title 15 code that provides the DOE with the authority to Promulgate Rules and Regulations.  The DOE with BOE oversight may simply need to PLUG THE QC HOLE referenced at the beginning of this article with TIMELY HAND COUNT AUDITS.  These could be done on a 100% or sample basis.

Why do I highlight TIMELY?  If we have learned anything in the last 4 years we have learned that the courts are resistant to take “election” cases.  When they do they can take years.  Have you ever asked why?  How about conflicts of interest?  Once elected officials are placed in office they have an obvious conflict of interest.  At best (for them) nothing happens after an audit.  At worst a problem is discovered that could shine the light on their election.  An investigation has the potential to get them removed from office.  Some judges are elected.  Attorney Generals are elected.  Sheriffs are elected.  Gee, I can’t understand why these investigations never really seem to get anywhere.  In my opinion any audits done after the certification of an election are too late.  There is no reason to delay.  These are not rocket science.  If done on a sample basis they don’t take significantly more resources.  To the extent they meet the requirements of other audits that would have been performed later anyway, they don’t take any additional resources.  Why not do them immediately after the polls close before ballots are moved anywhere?

8.3  Concerned Citizens  BOE/ DOE:  Meetings

While the solutions could be implemented by the BOE/DOE who knows if they are  If not many express concern, why should they act?  I’m sure they have a lot on their plate.  On the other hand if you agree with the analysis above you could show up to a Board of Elections meeting either in person or by phone and respectfully express your concern to the members of the DOE and the BOE in the public session.  You will get 3 minutes.   If they get enough concern from the public they would probably be happy to help.  Alternatively, maybe they could provide additional information to alleviate the concerns?  The details regarding the August public meeting can be found here.

https://publicmeetings.delaware.gov/#/meeting/79216

8.4  Concerned Citizens:  BOE /DOE Email:  After many requests the BOE has finally provided a an email address.  That address is  StateBoardOfElections@delaware.gov .  If you do research that can show specific concerns regarding the integrity of our systems, maybe even connected to references in Title 15 code, write them an email and make them aware of the concerns. 

8.5  What am I going to do?

Well, maybe some of all of the above but regarding the Old Fiparoo, I plan to see if I can get even further confirmation that we do not do public audits of the Absentee and Early Vote ballots.  So far, I have:  1.) reviewed the Title 15 code,  2.)  reviewed the reports of the audits of the “In Person” machines that are published on the DOE site, 3.) asked election officials in open meetings who confirmed that the RLA’s as described above are not done for the Absentee and Early Vote systems.

With that said I also found a section of “Administrative Code” related to our Delaware Elections.  The code states that the DOE is required to audit of the Absentee System after February 1^st in the year following an Election for whatever good an audit that late would do.  Unfortunately there is no specification that such an audit must be done in public, or put on the DOE website, but the audit report is to be presented to the BOE.  Is this why we don’t do RLA’s right after the election for Absentee and Early? Isn’t the Administrative Code something that can be changed by the BOE/ DOE?

Even though its timing may make if of limited use I thought if it exists it might tell us something.  One BOE member has been reported as not ever remembering getting such a report. I may have missed it but I have never seen a reference to such a report in any BOE meeting minutes.  I submitted a FOIA request for a copy of any such reports for the 2020 and 2022 elections.  The response was short.  “Please be advised that the Department has no public records responsive to your request”.  As of this writing, I have still found no evidence any such audits were performed for the elections requested.  I don’t know if they were ever performed, or when they were stopped if they were, or why, and by whom?  I’ll keep looking for more information and pushing for more hand count audits…………so “they” whoever they are…..can’t do…..The Old Fliparoo.

In the meantime have fun with your Cheat-O-Matic!

FIRST AND FOREMOST VOTE! 

There are concerns and perhaps confusion about the best method to vote, but let’s be clear, even if there is fraud, it is important to vote.  It is even more important to vote if there is fraud, vs. if there is not.  Why?  Many schemes for voter fraud depend on “bad actors” utilizing names on the voter roll that are “not used”.  If you don’t vote, YOUR name is “not used” and some say it can be matched with a fraudulent ballot.  If you do vote, that is one less name the bad actors can use. 

Methods:

So now let’s get into the method’s currently available for voting in Delaware.  There are 3 generic methods.  They are:  1.)  “Day of In Person” (DO)  2.)  Early-In-Person (EIP) , and 3.)  Absentee (AV).  The DO method is the most traditional.  You show up to the polls on election day, you show your ID and in Delaware you typically vote on a machine.  With EIP voting, you show up in the allocated days prior to “the” election day and you enter your vote on the same type machine.  Finally with the Absentee Method, you request a paper ballot from the Department of Elections (DOE).  That can be done by email.  They typically send you a blank ballot and a return envelope by USPS mail.  Ideally, the voter fills out the ballot and then “causes the ballot to be returned” to the DOE.

Day of In Person:  Benefits/ Concerns:

Most often this method of voting goes off without a hitch.  You go to the polls, wait in line less than the time it takes to get a cup of coffee and vote.  Then you get that wonderful little sticker and wear it beaming with pride for the rest of the day for having done your patriotic duty. 

With that said, in our last election (2022) there were problems.  Printers and poll books went down, certain locations ran out of ballots and lines got long in some locations.  There is concern that with DO voting you might have an emergency on election day so you can’t get to the polls.  In 2022 there were anecdotal stories that people that showed up to the polls, only to be told that they had already submitted an Absentee Ballot.  They were denied their right to vote.  It is because of these problems that some suggest you use the EIP, or AV methods and “Bank Your Vote”. 

Early In Person AND Absentee Voting:

By reviewing the comments above it would appear that the advantages of the EIP and AV methods would be convenience, and a higher probability that you will get a ballot submitted.  So what are the downsides?  Some, myself included believe that these methods are more susceptible to fraud.  In the case of the Absentee Ballot, once it leaves the voters hands, does it get’s back to the DOE without substitution or other incident.  While the vote by candidate is not known prior to the polls closing, the information as to how many people have showed up to vote by Absentee and Early, methods, and the party of each are known and available. There are concerns that by requesting your ballot, you are giving any potential cheaters an early estimate of how many ballots might be needed to win a race.

Absentee + Early Voting :  Special Concern in Delaware

All, Day of In Person (DO):  Voting machines, are subject to post election quality control checks on a percentage basis.  Generically these QC checks are referred to as a “Risk Limiting Audits” (RLA’s).  From a pool of all such machines, various random samples are selected. The paper ballots are removed from the machines and hand counted and checked against the results reported by the computer system on election night.

The ABSENTEE AND EARLY VOTE BALLOTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO SUCH AN AUDIT!  While such an oversight is hard to fathom, a review of audit reports posted by the DOE will show that the machines that scan these categories of ballots have never been selected for such public view post election Risk Limiting audits.  DOE personnel have confirmed that this is the case in public audit of the DO machines.  Finally a FOIA request asking if any such audits were available for these categories of ballots confirmed no such public reports were available.  It follows that if an algorithm were present, or injected, to “flip votes” from candidate A to B it would not be caught in the course of a normal election.  In 2022 over 20% of the voters chose the Absentee and Early methods and as a result their ballots, circumvented the QC step that was performed for the DO vote. The concern is that by putting your ballot through these machines it could get flipped and you could actually help not your guy….but the other guy.

BEST OF BOTH WORLDS?  So there are concerns with each of the methods of voting.  Is there a Best of Both Worlds?

Consider this: 1.) Request Your Absentee Ballot: 2.) Keep it, Don’t Send it Back. 3) Vote Day of In Person with your blank Absentee Ballot, and official DOE return envelope in your pocket. Why?

In the 2022 election, I had valid reason to get my Absentee Ballot.  I was concerned I would be away on election day and therefore I requested and received my Absentee Ballot.  By doing so, 1. ) I prevented anyone else from being able to get my Absentee Ballot.  In addition if on election day, during DO voting someone had told me I already voted, 2.) I would have proof that I had not, and I would have evidence of systemic fraud.  Finally, what about that last concern, what if there were just mechanical problems on Election Day and lines got to be 4 hours long.  Well, I would still have had my Absentee Ballot, and 3.) As my back-up plan I could drop it off at a DOE location prior to the close of the polls.

As circumstances occurred, I was able to vote in person.  Upon presenting my ID, the poll workers properly acknowledged that I had requested an Absentee Ballot.  I indicated that was correct.  I asked them if the system showed that I had returned that ballot.  They properly said no and let me vote.  I then showed them my blank Absentee Ballot and Return Envelope and asked if they would like me to “void” or destroy them? They properly said that was not necessary because upon casting my “in person” vote the system would know that, and prevent people from counting my Absentee Ballot if it, or a fraudulent one in my name showed up later.

Conclusion:  There are many different reasons you may NEED to vote Early or Absentee.  If you really have a pressing need these may be best for you.  On the other hand, I personally believe that these are more vulnerable to fraud.  I believe a “flipping” algorithm is one of the most efficient ways to cheat with the least chance of the “bad actor” being caught. I believe that actually the hardest part of such a scam is to convince “the other team” to put their ballots into the part of the system that circumvents the QC check. After all, the cheater won’t flip votes of their team.  The trick would be to get the opposition to put their votes in the part of the system that circumvents the QC check. 

Here is the link to the DOE site regarding absentee voting. DOE Absentee Voting At the bottom of that page you can request the ballot 2 ways. I would recommend method 2 where you fill out the form and send it by email. That way you have a record of when it was sent.

This was taken from the FAQ’s page on the the DOE website regarding whether you can vote in person after having requested an Absentee Ballot.

OK, there is quit a bit to consider regarding the methods of voting. With all that being said, I will finish this note where I started.  NO MATTER WHAT METHOD YOU CHOOSE,  VOTE!

APRIL YTD Stats 1,382 Voters Analyzed            266 Challenges to Sussex Dept of Elections

MAY YTD Stats   3,949 Voters Analyzed            795 Challenges to Sussex Dept of Elections

In March I drafted a short article with an attached video that showed that much of any potential fraud starts with the voter rolls.  https://delawarecounts.com/p/it-all-starts-with-the-voter-rolls   In simple terms, to be successful at certain types of cheating, a bad actor needs to match an “illegal name (1)” on the voter roll, with a ballot.  Now, If the illegal name is removed and not there in the first place they can’t do that.  That is what cleaning up the rolls is all about.  Illegal here meaning not a valid Delaware voter due to move out of state or death.

In that article I alluded to an effort with which I was involved that was just getting started.  I was providing some “prototype” training sessions to several, but one in particular named Barb, ran with it.  At first she said I was coming at her with a “fire hose” of information, but she, and others she found on her own initiative wanted to do this stuff.  They got together, and then BY ACTUALLY DOING, started to add tools, re-prioritize order of activities, match activities with volunteer capabilities and much much more that was not in my prototype sessions.  That group is now finding references in the federal code related to election law of which I was unaware of the details.  I just said to Barb, DO NOT SLOW DOWN, but you are coming at me with a “fire hose” of new information and it’s hard to keep up.

So what are these Sussex Superstars Doing?  A few highlights are listed below:

Sussex OV2:  Progress to Date

1.  The Group:  They are currently 21 strong and growing.  While the group started out of the GOP Integrity effort they pride themselves as having members from other parties on the team and approaching this from non-partisan basis.  Clean voter rolls helps everyone.  This was initially key to cooperation with the Department of Elections.

2.  Tools/ Product:  They employ many tools, such as the Delaware Voter Rolls, other State Voter Rolls, County property records, True the Vote’s IV3, NCOA lists, obituary sites and many more to find suspected illegal names.  When a situation is found, they document it in the product, a “Challenge Record”.

3.  OV2:  They call themselves OV2.  On the face it stands for Operation Verify Voters but those on the inside know tongue in cheek it is also a bit of pride.  While the team all loves True the Vote they have a higher “find rate” so the number in their name should be at least one better than that in IV3. It’s motivation! 

4.  Names:  In April, they analyzed 1,382 names.  With improving processes and more people on the task that number has increased by 2.5 X to 3,949 May.  Are you going to sign up and help that increase again by multiples in June?

5.  Challenge Records:  To date, 1,000 names submitted to DOE for removal with over 40% of those removed to date and more occur as the DOE system processes their paperwork.

6.  Vulnerabilities / Systemic Errors Discovered:  The OV2 team has not only found the following example situations but they have been able to work interactively and co-operatively with the Department of Elections personnel to address the issues.  Some of these are in negotiations and they are taking the lead to see if any processes adopted by the Sussex DOE can be done in Kent and Sussex too.  Stay tuned.

6.1 DOE Choices:  Given evidence of an illegal name, (for example that a person has moved) there may be multiple processes that the DOE can take for removal depending on the situation.  In general it appears that they often chose the process that can take for up to four years for removal, rather than opting for those consistent with Federal Guidelines that could be used to justify removal of the name immediately.  About 1/3 are removed pretty quickly upon certification by the “illegal” voter of that move out of state.

Interestingly, the DOE does receive notification from SOME states that a former Delaware voter is now registered there.  When such government-to-government notification is received, that voter is immediately removed from Delaware.  Delaware is a state that provides this notification to the previous state of a new voter in Delaware. This sharing information on new voters to their old residence state is a tremendous opportunity to keep double registration and reduce inflated voter rolls. 

6.2 DOE Implementation of ERIC:  While ERIC is touted as a tool that can help clean voter rolls, Delaware’s utilization of this tool shows that people are often confirmed as simultaneously being registered in two ERIC states at the same time.  Additional process steps are being considered to perhaps prevent that from happening.

6.3 Voters who live in DE, but pass away in another state.  Example a hospital over the line in PA or MD, or moving back to family member residence due to quality-of- life issues.

6.4 Voters registered at commercial addresses.  This actually caused the Department of Elections to get involved due to finding hundreds of voters registered at private mail box address sites.

6.5 A single individual, with two valid State of Delaware voter ID numbers.  (Very Rare).

7.  Training of Candidates and Volunteer Door Knockers:  More names can be removed quicker, if we can get confirmation of suspected illegal registration situations from the residents of a dwelling or a family member.  Towards that end, the OV2 team is working to arm a few candidates with specialized voter rolls, forms, and training, that will help them recognize that a potential illegal name may be present at a residence BEFORE they knock on the door.  Those trained will also know what they can do right there “ON THE SPOT” to help the occupants of the residence correct the situation, and in doing so they can protect their family from being accused of nefarious action if such action occurred in the future.

__________

When I told her I wanted to publish a report on this progress, Barb asked that I not put everyone’s contact information “out there”.  With that said, I also agreed to collect names of those who have interest in getting “hands on” in such efforts.  A new coordinator is coming up to speed in Kent County, and we are trying to get more people up and running here in New Castle County too.  Another point, let’s say you are a candidate, or volunteer that has other interests.  All the things you learn about the voter rolls and illegal names from this exercise will also be useful in those other efforts. The efforts are not mutually exclusive. You are already on the phone or at the door. With a little more knowledge…… two birds, one stone.

If you have an interest, drop me a line at dlesher3@comcast.net, or 302-559-9585 and we will get you hooked up and trained as demand requires.  I’ll also be trying to re-vamp my trainings so we can incorporate and get the benefit of the things they are learning in Sussex.  By the way, although she did request I not put the contact information out there in public……. if you are in Sussex and see anyone sporting an OV2 tee-shirt you might want to say thank you!!!

Note: 1)  Illegal Names:  While the term “illegal name” may spur visions nefarious individuals in a cloak and dagger movie, the “illegal name” is not necessarily that.  Most often, they could be innocent situations such as when an adult child that moves away from home.  It could also be a death.  It could be a former residence of a house.

Just because the “illegal names” is on the list for an innocent reason doesn’t mean a “bad actor” can’t use it.  After all, if we can find them, so can the bad guys.  If we get the names removed, they can no longer find them.  Even if they don’t get removed, the data can be used to “Challenge” a ballot, if for example a ballot with an illegal name shows up where absentee ballots are processed.

It all starts with the voter rolls!  In presentations to local groups, I have a couple of slides in the presentation where I look at the voter rolls, and “hypothetical” election results both from the perspective of an honest person, and the perspective of a cheater.  I talk about vulnerabilities and highlight the “sweet spot” of hypothetical “phantom names” on the rolls.  What I have discussed “in theory” on those slides, (ahem before the video below came out I might add) Jeff O’Donnell has now done way better than me, and he also has more supporting data.  Jeff will be adding more videos but the fact that he is doing this in 15 minutes bite size increments is also great. 

Here is the link:  Fingerprints of Fraud: Voter Rolls

What about Delawares Voter Rolls?

I am involved with a group that is trying to clean up the voter rolls.  It is a GOP effort but I really don’t think cleaning rolls is a partisan issue, or doesn’t need to be.  Too early for real data but I can report some early results for my specific situation.  I have started researching the voter roll for my Election District (ED).  I have only been through a very small sample, and I have not found every category Jeff talks about in the video but have found quite a few.  My results need a little more work, so I must temper this update and start sentences with “I believe” as opposed to “I can prove”. 

OK, with that disclaimer, I believe I am finding (and documenting) voters registered in DE and another state at the same time.  In over ½ of these instances the “other state” is an ERIC state.  I have found a voter who hasn’t voted for awhile….and appears to live out of state…..(NC) but then submitted an absentee ballot in the 2020 election and became active again.  I believe I have found a person that as a result of an “in-state” move………and probably through no nefarious intent of her own ……now has two voter ID’s, each registered at a different address.  She may not even know about the situation, but if I found it, do you suspect there is a cheater out there that also knows about it and has a means to exploit it?  I found a property owner who has now signed an affidavit that indicates that he has been the sole occupant of his house for over 10 years.  With that said, in 2020 the DOE sent an absentee ballot to a person it had registered at that DE address.  The “mailing address” for that DE voter, according to the DOE was a MD address.  The State of DE rolls indicate an absentee ballot was sent back and processed.  The bottom line is that it only took a tiny sample from my little bitty ED to surface examples of the many categories that Jeff is shows in the video.  It appears they are happening here in DE also.

So how do we fix it?   If you are interested in topics like cleaning the voter rolls, or actually interested in getting involved in an effort to clean up the rolls please drop me a line at dlesher3@comcast.net   Regarding the effort I am involved with you don’t need to be an expert in spreadsheet (Excel) or presentation software (Powerpoint) but at this point you should probably have a laptop, at least have some familiarity with such programs….. and be comfortable navigating the internet.  No guarantees but if you have an interest let me know.

BOE Meeting Link

https://publicmeetings.delaware.gov/#/meeting/74015

It appears that the primary purpose of this meeting is for the BOE to facilitate an executive session related to discuss personnel issues, perhaps related to issues observed during the 2022 mid-term. Such an executive meeting was referenced at the prior meeting.

The agenda item does allow for public comment prior to the motion to enter executive session.

The letter appropriately touched on several failures that were observed in the recent election.  She referenced failure of machines, failure of planning, failure of oversight, and failure of response.  I compliment her pointing out these items and amplifying the significance of each of those categories of failure and also that these problems are not a partisan issue.

Her letter is addressed to the Commissioner of the Department of Elections (DOE) which goes on to propose at a minimum 3 specific action items:

1.  Fire two Middle Managers as a minimum:  Specifically, the Director and Deputy Director of the New Castle County DOE.  

2.  Have an Inquiry:  She believes that an investigation by the very non-balanced General Assembly could get results.

3.  Ballot Shortage Report:  She asks the Commissioner  to provide a report on the number of locations where there were ballot shortages…but not a report on any of the other items.

I believe the problems and vulnerabilities in our election process are greater in scope than implied by Ms. Brady’s letter.  If the scope is expanded it might also follow that the set of recommendations and inquiries might also be expanded.

There were additional “Day of Election” failures:  I have interviewed poll workers who kept detailed notes from two locations.  I also add my observations from the location where I cast my own vote.   The results are presented in Table 1.  There were additional voting machine failures.  There were poll-book failures, poll book printer outages, serious touch screen issues, poll books reducing the number of registered voters throughout the day, error and warning messages that showed up on the screens that were not addressed in training sessions or referenced in training manuals.  Finally, the most obvious evidence that failure was on a large scale was the wait time on the DOE help lines.  

In the system, there were also “non-election day” failures that the voter does not see.  Some of these may cause more concern with respect to integrity than even the problem of running out of ballots.  The Board of Elections (BOE) including the Commissioner were made aware of concerns at their meeting on 7/11/22, 9/19/22 well before the election when there was still time to do something about them.  

Details are presented here:  https://www.delawarecounts.com/open-letter.html:

This open letter not only highlights process concerns and election system vulnerabilities but also illustrates a breakdown in the systems that are supposed to be in place to allow for fixing system when it breaks.

While there may be concerns at the Director/ Deputy Director level, I have reason to look higher.  As one example, I had asked the Deputy Director for a copy of the written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) for the post-election audits.  At that time I had hoped to attend one in the future and wanted to know what to expect.  I also hoped to look for potential vulnerabilities in the process.  I was forwarded an extract of an email that was reportedly from the Commissioner.  It confirmed that the DOE doesn't have an SOP for that process.  If that extract was from the Commissioner, wouldn’t that mean the Commissioner has made a judgement call that an SOP is not beneficial or needed?

In another example, the Commissioner and all BOE members were made aware of concerns with the pre-election Logic and Accuracy Test associated with the ballot scanners and the lack of a post-election audit of same scanners.  Those scanners processed about  24% +/-  of the 2022 vote.  They did not acknowledge, follow-up, refute or even show any evidence that they understood the concerns.  Combine that and the recent election day performance, I believe it fair to say we might need to understand not only what is going on at the Director and Deputy director level but also what is going on above that level.

Ms. Brady railed on the poor quality of the election.  I have expanded on the scope of the problem.  But what was the opinion of the Commissioner?  What was the opinion of the members of the BOE?  Do they agree with either Ms. Bradys analysis or my analysis?  Are they in touch with reality?  The BOE had a meeting on 11/21/22.  Mr. Albence went through an 11 slide presentation.  On only 1 slide, and on only 2 lines of that 19 line slide,  Mr. Albence reported on his assessment of the election day events.

“Generally usual Election Day issues encountered”
“Activation cards supplies at some New Castle County Polling places”

Board member Schneikert did speak up regarding card supplies and requested an Executive session later (of course out of sight of the public).  There were other comments but no significant discussion of the details or of other issues.  Were they so concerned they decided to convene an emergency special session with expanded transparency and more open communications?  No!  In fact, the members were so unconcerned regarding problems observed they all agreed to take December and June off.  I was concerned that they might sprain an arm, or a wrist from all the patting of themselves on the back for such a good job!  

So you decide:  Do you think they are in touch with reality, and do you think they have experience or qualifications to oversee the complex computer based election system(s)?  Do you think they would recognize a problem if they saw it or just accept as gospel anything Mr. Albence tells them?  

Here are a few more observations regarding the BOE.  The 10-member BOE is comprised of 5 Democrat members and 5 Republican members.  They can conduct business with a quorum of 6, and they can meet without a quorum, which would at least provide the public a means to make a statement to them.  You can only make a statement because they do not allow you to ask a question, and you are limited to 3 minutes.  

With all that said, in a mid-term election year and a high focus of concern on election integrity, the board decided not to meet for 4 consecutive months from March-June inclusive.  The reason listed for not meeting was due to “board vacancies”.  When they finally met in July, it was two new Republican members who were welcomed to the board.

We may have very good and well-meaning people at the commissioner and board levels but if you are now questioning whether they have the right background or specialty experience to oversee the operation of a complex, highly technical, behemoth of a computer-based election system, the next question is how did they get there?

According to section 301 of Title 15 it appears that the Director is appointed by the Governor so any failure at that level is a reflection on the Governor.  The Commissioner’s term is up 6/23.  Now section 209 shows that board members responsible for oversight of the Commissioner and DOE are not elected but rather appointed for a term of 4 years.  Normally when a term expires individuals start their path to the board by being nominated by the respective chair of each political party.  That would be Betsy Maron and Jane Brady.  

With that review I think I can make some additional recommendations and ask for inquiries beyond those in Ms. Brady’s letter.  I have taken a first shot at that in table 2.  Feel free to review and let me know if you have any additions, subtractions or what you think at delawarecounts@protonmail.com.

Finally, in Ms. Brady’s letter she asks for resignation of the Director and Deputy Director of New Castle County Department of Elections.  

I would like to tell a story that might serve as a positive example for those above the Director level at the DOE and those on the BOE.  

 I was one of the 25+ public attendees that witnessed the most recent post-election audit where the attendees interacted with the Director, Tracey Dixon.  Ms. Dixon and staff had set up the room and an had done some work in preparation for post-election audit.  The “random selection” had already been performed and ballots had already been gathered from the warehouse.  Ms. Dixon was beginning the audit.  The public expressed concern that the “random selection” had not being performed in view of the public.  This must have seemed unusual from Ms. Dixon’s perspective in that rarely do any, let alone many from the public, show up.  You can confirm that for yourself here:  

https://elections.delaware.gov/information/elections/post_election_audits.shtml

When you confirm, you will see the DOE often does this audit with only DOE personnel present.  

When the public expressed concern she appeared to feel confident in her expertise and provided a slight pushback.  After all, her group had done a bit of preparation work and was perhaps trying to be considerate of everyone’s time.  The public firmly but politely explained their reasons for the concern as related to transparency and that witnessing the “random selection” was a key element of the audit.  

It wasn’t only what Ms. Dixon did next that was good, it is also what she didn’t do that was refreshing to those who have tried to interact with certain others at the DOE and with the board members at the BOE.

She did not say:  “You’ll have to submit that question as part of a FOIA request” as other have done at the DOE.

She did not say:  “You are not allowed to ask questions you are only allowed to make statements” as the board members tell the public at the BOE meetings.

She did not say:  “OK thank you your 3 minutes are up” and then move on as the board members do at the BOE meetings.  

What she did to was interact with the public to understand the concern.  She listened!  She said  “OK…..if you want to do another random drawing we can”.

She negotiated and allowed a few other tweaks to the process that provided more transparency and reduced vulnerability.  Perhaps unknown to Ms. Dixon, with three simple, really simple changes to the procedure, she eliminated or reduced 3 of 5 previously identified vulnerabilities of the test.  

I believe and hope DOE personnel and the public learned from each other and weren’t just putting up with each other and being polite.  I know there are other issues beyond this single event that are at stake, but for this example to the BOE and others at the DOE.  Thank you Tracey.

Item 1 - Electronic Poll Books and Printers

1.1   Printer Issues:  (My personal voting experience):  Cook: Elementary:  Arrived and got in line at 8:27 AM.  Line was long because poll book printer has been physically jammed.  Printer out since “about 7:45 AM”.  Several resets of printers required at Edison.

1.2  Outage or Frozen:  Poll books were observed “out or frozen” at the 3 different locations.  Two locations reported outage at rush hour.  Edison reported both books frozen starting at 4:58 pm.  Lombardy reported outage of one book and slow performance of a 2nd starting about 5:30 PM.

1.3  Different Times:  Time on poll books, off by 1 hour.  (Edison)

1.4  Changing # of Registered Voters: The number of registered voters reported by DOE website as of 11/1/22 for referenced location (Edison) was 2,531.  Poll book snapshots were documented at as 2527, and 2522 at perhaps the “incorrect” poll book times of 13:50 and 18:35 respectively. Is that OK?  The turnout at this location was amazingly low at about 21%.   To provide context, the total difference of 9 in the poll book numbers was a magnitude equal to 36% of the total Republican Vote in the race for Attorney General at that location.

1.5  Ballots Not Read by Machine:  Multiple (Edison), had to be spoiled.

1.6.  1 Ballot through the printer printed no bar code (Edison)

Item 2 - Voting Machines

2.1  Failed Screen:  Edison:  7:00 AM:  One of 4 touch screens would not work at all and required service call.  Hold time reported on service line was 20 minutes.  Eventually a technician did arrive and the repair was done.  Total ballots for that machine for the day was 28 or about 5% of the ballots at the location.  That implies that it was not available to process ~ 80% of the ballots it was placed there to process.  

2.2  Touch Screen Problems:  Lombardy/ Edison.  Confirm touching of certain candidates did not initially work and voters requested help.  Discussed in Brady letter, will not elaborate further.

Item 3 - Error Messages not referenced in Training manual

There were many error messages and situations that were not referenced in DOE training manuals.

3.1  Wrong ballot length.  (Edison)

3.2  Printed Card Not Read:  (Edison)

3.3  Ballot Container Almost Full:  (Lombardy) This message was triggered at about 300+/- ballots.  Confusion resulted and inspector temporarily stopped using the machine   (More lines)

Item 4 - Ballot Shortage

(Lombardy)  Even after inspector reported “in person” to “roving” DOE personnel that location was short on ballots, with about 2 hrs notice prior to running out.  Rover was reported to have provided ballots she had on hand and that she would bring more.  The site ran out and was down for ~35 minutes starting at ~ 5:40 PM

Item 5 - Help Desk

Inspector and individual poll workers were dialing and waiting for someone to answer help line for either mechanical problems or voter help desk issues.  Lombardy:  Inspector reported need to get to help desk assistance for approximately 10+ voter issues and twice for supplies with average wait time about 25 min.  +/-.  (That’s ~ 5 hrs on help line)

Item 1 - Legislators

Please consider laws that require elimination of machines to simplify the mess.  Human based hand mark, hand count systems are not perfect, just better.   

Item 2 - Party Chairs: Governor

Until #1 above is done, please consider review of your criteria for filling BOE and Commissioner positions.  Technical, Process, QC and other backgrounds might be appropriate.  

Item 3 - BOE Members

With the advent of complex computer systems the days of this being a nice easy assignment and title as an award for political loyalty are gone.  Given recent election result it is evident that LATE HOURS and a lot of HOMEWORK in preparation for OVERSITE WORK is needed.  You are the next to last defense to integrity of our elections.

Do not continue to get information from the single source that is the Commissioner.   In an oversite roll you don’t just ask members of the DOE questions because you don’t know the answer and want them to educate you.  You ask questions because you are the expert and want to see if they know the correct answers.  If you don’t know the code, learn it.  If you don't have the expertise, get it, or find people that can help you with what questions to ask.

Meet in person and on zoom and be open to two way dialog with the public.  Provide contact information.  Sometimes public will purr, sometimes they will bark, but after a bit, it probably won’t be too bad, unless of course you continue to try to muzzle them.

Item 4 - Commissioner

With respect to Ms. Brady’s focus on ballot shortages can you confirm whether the State of Delaware purchased the "CentralPoint®  or equivalent application that was advertised in the bid package?  That system:

“allows the Delaware Election Commissioner to monitor the statewide poll activity from one location” and “allows election administrators to timely address issues before they become serious problems” and can alert elections officials when ballot style quantities are about to run low?  

If this is the case, within reason, it shouldn’t matter how many ballots were provided at the beginning of the day if the "CentralPoint®  or equivalent system is implemented properly?  

Please explain why you have not acknowledged, addressed, or refuted any items in the open letter.

Please clarify the budget items in the November BOE meeting? Between the COE and counties, there are expenditures on the order of about $19,000,000+/- ?   There are 2022 and 2023 references. What is time period does that amount cover? Is that rolling 1 yr expenditures? Two years expenditures or other?

Item 5 - Public

Be more “hands on” and critically observant of the process.  Look at the code.  Attend a BOE meeting.  Attend public tests.  If you have an interest in election integrity consider signing up for new posts at  delawarecounts.com  or drop us a line at delawarecounts@protonmail.com.

An open letter to: The Department of Elections, The Board of Elections and The Public

Over a year ago I started looking into our election processes here in Delaware.  I believe I have found many vulnerabilities and some inefficiencies in our election systems.  I am concerned that in some cases State Processes may not be in conformance with State Law.  Even if the vulnerabilities have never been exploited I believe that to the extent possible they should be eliminated.  I have proposed many solutions to eliminating those vulnerabilities.    A summary of observations is presented in Exhibit 1 attached. 
 
With observations, concerns and solutions identified my next goal was to communicate and interact with personnel at the Department of Elections (DOE) and those on the Board of Elections (BOE).  I wanted to receive more information and I wanted to make them aware of the items presented in Exhibit 1.
 
I have tried to interact through the casual and more formal methods.  As a member of the public I have found it difficult to interact with the DOE or BOE on anything but the simplest of issues.  As illustrations of this difficulty I provide Exhibit #2 titled My Experience Trying to Interact with the DOE and BOE. 
 
As a fellow citizen I believe the concerns presented Exhibit 1 still warrant review and action to eliminate vulnerabilities.  I am still requesting that the BOE and / or DOE report back or interact with me and or the public in a way and  at a level of detail that demonstrates that they are aware of the issues and with respect to what they plan to do to resolve vulnerabilities if anything. 
 
If there are any questions or if you would like to interact regarding solutions please feel free to contact me at delawarecounts@protonmail.com.  I am willing to help.  Thank you for your consideration.

Exhibit 1: 
Observations and Concerns Regarding Election Systems and Processes in Delaware:

This attachment summarizes observations detailed in a two presentations that can be found on Delawarecounts.com  In the two presentations (total 2+ hours) many items are surfaced but those related to the vulnerability of the system are summarized below for convenience.
 
1.  Primary Results 2022:  Absentee and Early Voting Ballot Vulnerability?  In the presentations I argue that the Absentee Voting system is vulnerable to “stuffing” of the Absentee Ballot box.  In item 9 and 10 below, I express concern that both Absentee and Early Voting ballots could be vulnerable to “Date Trigger Flip” type programming to effect fraud.  In short a “Date Trigger Flip” algorithm is one that within the computer could flip for example every 15th vote for candidate A, to vote for candidate B.  Such a “Flip” algorithm would not be turned on until a specific “Trigger Date” or time.   The Trigger Date would be a date or time after which the DOE has already completed the Logic and Accuracy Tests (LATs) designed to approve the machines for use in the election.
 
If the two theories are above are correct could we see hints of such evidence in election data?  Wouldn’t the concerns above be consistent with data that show that winners in elections have a higher percentage of their (Absentee + Early) votes vs that same data for their competitors?  Said a different way, the more (Absentee + Early) votes an enemy or a cheater could get into the system the more they could flip votes, and when they flipped votes for a candidate A wouldn’t that skew that same data for candidate B?
 
We just had a primary election.  If every primary contest had two candidates and if the occurrences were random and there were no other influences we would expect that 50% of the time the winner would have a higher percentage of (Absentee +Early) votes than their competitor and the other 50% of the time the winner would have a lower percentage of (Absentee + Early) votes than their competitor.  Since some contests in the recent primary elections had more than 2 candidates, if my calculations are correct, the number is more like 43%.  Said again we would randomly expect the winner of the contest to have a higher percentage of their votes being (Absentee or Early) votes about 43% of the time.  If the number is less than that, it would not be consistent with the “stuffing and flipping” thesis.  Of the 31 contests reported in the recent primary elections, the winners had a higher percentage of their own vote being (Absentee + Early) ballots 67% of the time.  In the case of Democrat contests the number was only slightly higher at 69% and for Republican races the number was only slightly lower at 63%.  Given the few small number of races and other factors this information should not in any way be presented as “proof” of any nefarious action but perhaps it suggests we should not dismiss such vulnerability concerns as unthinkable.
 
2.  LAT Test Design:  The State of Delaware Title 15, Section 5523 (b) (1) (a) indicate that Logic and Accuracy Tests (LAT’s) shall ensure that the voting system is properly programmed.  The actual LATs conducted and witnessed for the absentee ballot scanners as performed by the State of Delaware (Department of Elections = DOE) are not capable of detecting even two of the most trivial examples of improper and coincidentally nefarious programming.  The examples are presented in videos but for simplicity let’s call these “Date Trigger-Flip” programming for convenience.  The State may not be in conformance of its own laws based on design of test.  Subsequent to the test for the absentee scanners, I attended an LAT for the “in person” machines.  The tests for those machines could not “catch” Date Trigger-Flip programming.
 
3.  LAT Test Results:  The actual LATs performed by DOE personnel on the absentee ballot scanners in preparation for the 5/10/22 school board elections revealed additional concerns regarding the system.  The scanners could not read between 13-25% of the test ballots that were properly filled out by DOE personnel.  DOE personnel postulated that the failure to read was because of some “light or flawed timing marks” on the perimeter of some of the printed ballots.  I postulated that these flaws could be related to mechanical printer, or improper programming concerns but underlying source was not resolved as part of the LAT.  A key point is that there was nothing that touched these ballots that were not part of the State of Delaware Election System and as a result one may interpret the failure to read as an error rate.  The State of Delaware is not allowed to purchase equipment unless it is certified as meeting EAC and VVSG performance standards.  VVSG standards require less than a .001% error rate.  The state may be in a second non-conformance of its own laws based on actual performance of the tests.
 
4.  Actual counting of ballots:  School Board Election:   The actual counting of ballots in the school board election included a “pre-screen” step.  DOE experts inspected 100% of the ballots, not for count, but rather to see if there were any errant marks on the ballots placed there by the voter or other items that might prevent proper subsequent scanning of the ballot.  If there were such issues those ballots would be removed from the population, “duplicated” and then the duplicate would be returned to the ballot population in preparation for scanning.  The end result was that after pre-inspection there a stack of ballots that one would expect to run perfectly through the scanners without problems.  The result?  Even after pre-inspection and duplication, approximately 12% of the ballots could not be read by the system.  If we include the ballots that were pre-screened we are back to a situation where up to 18% of the ballots could not be processed by the system and required duplication.  These results are not inconsistent with the results of the LAT.
 
5.  Actual Counting of Ballots:  2020 General Election.  A ballot that could not be read by a scanner would require “adjudication”.  Specifically, a group of humans would need to determine the intent of the voter for that ballot.  In practice it was observed that ballots that could not be read by the scanner were “duplicated”.  With this background, Patriots for Delaware submitted a FOIA request to the State of Delaware.  They asked the State of Delaware how many ballots required “adjudication” in the 2020 election.  The State of Delaware responded that the number was 47,205.  If we make some qualifying assumptions regarding “write in” votes and also assume that the majority of issues were related to mail in or absentee ballots (“MIABs”) this again gets to the order of about 20% of the MIABs.  That is similar to the magnitude observed in the LATs and the counting of the School Board Election ballots 1.5 years later.
 
6.  No Audit:  MIAB’s Scanner:  In Delaware, in 2020 this class of scanner counts the highest density of ballots.  By density I am referring to the highest number of ballots processed in the fewest number of locations and fewest number of machines.  In Delaware in New Castle county that would have been about 93,000 +/-ballots in 1-2 office suites.   As employed in Delaware, unless I am wrong, this class of machine is not subject to any type of post-election audit in the course of a normal election.
 
7.  Efficiency:  In Delaware the inability of the machines to be able to read voter intent on the first pass results on about 20% of the ballots, results in DOE human personnel doing 220% by hand, by eye inspections than they would if they just counted the ballots 100% by hand, by eye in the first place.
 
8.   Update:  Good and Bad News:   Actual Counting of Ballots:  I recently attended a session for counting of some of the Absentee ballots for the 2022 Primary election (9/12/22  3:00 PM).  I watched two batches of actual ballots being processed through the MIAB’s.  In one batch there was failure to read 3 of 90 or 3.3% of the ballots.  In a second batch the scanner failed to process 4 of 116 ballots or 3.4% of the ballots.  Upon discussion, DOE personnel informally indicated that again one concern was “bad timing marks” down the left side of the ballots.  I was shown examples of a flawed ballots that wouldn’t run through the scanner.  Again, informally a DOE employee indicated he believed that the problem had been associated with 1 printer and DOE had stopped using that printer at some point.  That said it was not understood at this point what was causing the printer to print ballots with “bad timing marks”.  I applaud the DOE personnel for partial diagnosis, and taking corrective action on an issue that appears to have been present at least since 2020.  While taking some corrective action appears to have improved the most recent results over the prior results reported in items 2-4 above the results still show the system does not come close to achieving VVSG performance standards.
 
9.  VULNERABILITY Summary Items 2,6:  As a security measure the legislature built into the law a pre-condition to using certain machines.  The legislature allows the use of machines to count our ballots based on the assumptive pre-condition that a test be performed (LAT) that can “ensure that the system is properly programmed”.  The LATs the State employs don’t do that.  I am even concerned whether it is possible to design a test that could “catch” variations of Date-Trigger-Flip programming.   Given this reality perhaps the ONLY protection Delaware would have is human inspection either on a 100% or sample basis.  
 
While Title 15 Section 5012A and the DOE recognize inspection solution this with respect to the “in person” “voting devices” (ES&S Express Vote XL Machines) I find it curious, and a grave omission that the Title 15 in effect has limited the definition of “voting device” to the in person voting machines.  The DOE has also “in practice” excluded the MIAB’s scanners from the post -election random audit process.  Let’s review that again for emphasis.  THE LATs for the CLASS OF MACHINE THAT PROCESS THE HIGHEST DENSITY OF VOTES, IN THE FEWEST LOCATIONS, ON THE FEWEST NUMBER OF MACHINES, CAN NOT DETECT EVEN THE MOST TRIVIAL TYPES OF NEFARIOUS IMPROPER PROGRAMMING, AND IN LAW, AND IN PRACTICE THEY HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE POST ELECTION AUDIT PROCESS.  If I am correct and I as an individual member of the public with no special resources can observe this vulnerability what are the chances that any foreign state or domestic enemy with significant resources has not also recognized this vulnerability?
 
In videos I propose a hypothetical attack strategy a single individual might employ given the observations above.  In this strategy, the primary purpose of the defective timing marks on Absentee Ballots would be simply to delay the process and afford the cheater the time needed to cheat elsewhere in the system.  In a second element of the strategy the hypothetical enemy would employ Date-Trigger-Flip algorithms in machines that are not subject to post election audits.
 
10.  EARLY VOTING PROCESS:  DESIGNED TO AVOID THE AUDIT?  The DOE has determined that for the early voting in the 2022 election it will use the standard ES&S Express Vote XL machines to mark ballots.  This machine is the same style machine that is used in normal “in-person election day” voting.  These machines are capable of both marking ballots, counting ballots, and then recording that information on media (a vendor proprietary thumb drive).  This is how they are typically employed in Delaware Elections yet for early voting they are NOT going to be deployed in this manner.
 
In the 2022 election starting with the primary’s the DOE has decided to only have voters “mark” the ballots with this “in person” machine.  At that point the ballots will be extracted from the machines, and then transported to a different location where they will be counted on the MIAB’s scanners.  What an unfortunate coincidence for those concerned about vulnerability of our elections that the DOE has chosen to scan the Early Vote Ballots on the machines that are not subject to post-election audit.
 
11.  Post-Election Audits:  Express Vote XL machines:   It has been confirmed by DOE officials (email) that the DOE does not have written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) for the post-election audits.  It follows that each audit could be performed differently each time and nobody would have any idea if it was being done correctly or not.  It also follows that the only way to determine what is actually done is to attend such an audit.  I have attended such an audit and discovered vulnerabilities.  In an effort to show the importance of SOP’s, I postulated five examples for defeating the methods I observed being used at the post-election audit.  Under section 5012A the DOE is required to post the audit results on their website.  I am not implying, nor could I prove that any of the defeat strategies I proposed were employed.  That said given the detail level provided in the audit reports I do not believe the DOE could prove they weren’t.  I don’t believe that is a good situation.  I believe with a few simple modifications to process it would be easy for the DOE to prove they could not have been employed.  Even if the vulnerabilities are not being exploited we should move to eliminate them from our processes.
 
12.  Solutions:  There are ways to change the DOE processes to address many of the observations and vulnerabilities presented above.  They range from things as simple as changing the room location and times when post-election audits are performed, to additional redundant in person inspection of the ballots either on a 100% or sample basis.  There are many feasible solutions and improvements that can be implemented by the DOE under the authority of section 5522(b) of Title 15 and as a result no additional enabling legislation is necessary.  

Exhibit 2
My Experience trying to interact with the Department of Elections and The Board of Elections

1.  Interactions at Public Demonstrations:
 
Interactions with personnel at public tests such as the Logic and Accuracy Test’s (LAT) and the post-election audits have typically been good.  Except for one recent incident individuals explained what they were doing and they answered the simple questions I could think to answer at the time.  
 
2.  Email Interactions:  As I started to understand more of the process I started to ask more difficult and perhaps more sensitive questions.  A few examples of what might be sensitive questions follow:
 

1. Do you agree that the LAT couldn’t catch these specific examples of improper code? (i.e Date Trigger Flip) type algorithms.

2. Are you allowed access to the underlying code in the machines, and if not, who is and can I get their contact information?

3. During the test it was indicated that “they” set up the machines, who was the “they”?  Was it another DOE group, an outside vendor or someone else?

The response is that I was referred to the DOE link for FOIA requests.  I clicked on the link.  It didn’t work.  I saved the screen shot of the error message.  While it didn’t work, the error message directed me to a back-up email address (gic@delaware.gov).  

I reviewed the FOIA process and looked at the example questions above and others and realized many were not appropriate for a FOIA request.  I was not asking for documents, just opinions and directions to other experts.   I made a second plea by email regarding the questions that I felt were not appropriate for a FOIA request.  To my knowledge I never received a response from that email.  
 
3.  FOIA Request:   In parallel to my second email request I submitted a FOIA request to the “back-up” email address and from that back up address I received an acknowledgement that the request had been forwarded to the FOIA coordinator for elections.  That was in May 2022.  To my knowledge I never received a reply of any kind to my FOIA request.  
 
4.  Section § 302 Procedure:  I looked for additional means of contact.  I found section § 302 of Title 15 (highlights mine).
_________________
§ 302. General powers and duties of Commissioner.
The Commissioner shall have the following powers and duties:
(13) To establish procedures to allow citizens to report possible violations of this title to the Commissioner, to any county director, or to deputy county director, which shall include procedures for anonymous reporting of possible violations thereto;
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I thought that such a procedure might be appropriate since in some cases I am trying to report on “possible violations” to Title 15.  I found something that I first thought might have been intended to meet the intent § 302.  It was a pamphlet that was titled:  State of Delaware Department of Elections:  Administrative Complaints: “Following Federal and State Procedures”.  There was similar language in the code.  Upon review of this pamphlet I noticed that it did not allow for anonymous reporting, and did not focus on the possible violations of Title 15 but rather appeared to try to restrict the scope of concerns to those defined in the Federal Help America Vote Act of 2002.  It would be somewhat ironic that if this were the intended to be the procedure required under §302, in that the procedure itself may be in violation of Title 15.  In any case it appeared that the turnaround time for using this procedure was 90 days + 60 days which rendered it quite worthless in the context of the 2022 elections. 
 
5.  The Board of Elections (BOE) and Commissioner:  Website:  My next stop in trying to get information acknowledged was the BOE and the Commissioner.  After all they are ultimately responsible for oversight and repair of any vulnerabilities or inefficiencies in our elections systems.  If there are such concerns they would clearly want to know about them.  As a citizen I would also expect them to have a positive attitude and a scientific with respect to investigating and vetting concerns.  I would also expect them to be curious with respect to proposed solutions if someone had taken the time to not only raise concerns but also to actually propose solutions.
 
I found the link to the BOE https://elections.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml .  While this had the name of Board Members there were no contact phone numbers or email addresses.  I looked up the site for the meeting minutes and written agendas of the BOE.  I was surprised to find that with all the attention and focus on “Election Integrity” that, at that time, the BOE had not met in 7 of the prior 12 months, and had not met in the past 4 months (March-June) straight.  According to the notes they had not met due to board vacancies.  That led to even more questions.  Were candidates submitted in a timely manner?  Does it just take that long to find them?
 
6.  Board of Elections Virtual Meeting:  As it turned out the BOE had announce a meeting for July.  Great!  An opportunity to get the message to both Republican and Democrat board members and the Commissioner.  I called in and waited patiently for one hour and 23 minutes. I was then given 3 minutes.  This is what the minutes of that meeting indicated that I said:
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Public member Mr. Dan Lesher offered his email and phone number and requested the
emails and contact information of the Board members. Mr. Lesher voiced his concerns about
the error rates of voting devices and scanners and commented that he felt the
implementation of the voting system was not meeting standards.
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My statement was a bit more detailed and I indicated that I had significant additional concerns and that the information I presented was only 1 portion of 1 concern.  Upon completion Mr. Pasquale stated to Mr. Albence.  “Anthony, I’ll let the department send whatever they want to send to the board members along with yourself” to which Mr. Albence replied “OK…”  I am writing this on 9/18, and to my knowledge have had no contact from anyone, and have no confirmation as to whether Mr. Albence has sent anything to the BOE members at all or researched concerns at all.  
 
From my perspective as a citizen it got worse.  In a later discussion another member of the public expressed frustration with regard to not being able to contact the board without being filtered through the commissioner’s office.  This was on a completely independent matter I believe from a member of the Libertarian party.  They expressed that for them, the process had been problematic in the past.  In a response to both a board member responded.
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“this is a board that meets, and it is very carefully balanced and it doesn’t meet unless the balance is available, individual contact with any individual board member to bring up an issue, I don’t believe is appropriate”.  Another board member of opposite political party agreed and indicated that if there were issues the public needs to bring up, bring them to the monthly meeting.
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If that statement reflects the opinion of the board which I hope it does not I would like to make a few recommendations.  That statement would imply that the only way anyone would able to communicate with BOE members, or that board members could communicate with each other is at the monthly meetings.  If that is the case I would recommend immediately that the board meet at least monthly and preferably every two weeks.  I would request that they meet even if there is not a quorum or even if the board is not at full strength.  Why?  While the board may not have its balance to discuss topics at least they are providing the public or others a means of presenting information that can be recorded in the minutes and get on the agenda and studied for when the board does get back to full strength.  There may be things they need to know that can not wait 5 months.  A second practical suggestion is that the minutes of the then current meeting should be posted to the public within a week of the meeting.  Given recent history, it is not reasonable to have the public wait 4-5 months for approval of minutes at the next meeting to learn what was discussed at a prior meeting.  Finally even if a full attendance of the board is not possible the DOE should provide status reports to the BOE.  We the public and the BOE wouldn’t want to wait 4 months only to then learn then that plans and implementations for whatever reason are getting off track.   
 
As a citizen I disagree with the reluctant attitude the two board members expressed regarding their desire to not communicating with anyone unless there was a balanced full attendance of the board.  Does it follow from that logic that a board member shouldn’t research, investigate or do anything, or talk to anyone regarding DOE business unless there is a full balanced meeting of the board?  That could be a neat trick.  As a board member you could do absolutely nothing between board meetings and that logic would allow you to feel noble about not doing anything?  I wonder if the other members of the board, and / or nominating chairpersons feel the same way and would agree with that attitude?  I have served on boards.  Perhaps not as prestigious as the BOE but I thought the time between board meetings was the time to research, investigate, and interact with people from many backgrounds to understand what is going on and to determine if there are any issues or points of view that should be added to the agenda or expressed in discussions when the board does get back together to meet.  I might be a little out on a limb here but it might be possible that the Democrat members would want to make sure Democrat concerns are represented and Republican members might want to insure Republican concerns are represented and each might want to talk to people in the public and their respective parties between meetings to understand those concerns.  I acknowledge and support the concept of “balance” but would argue that the “balance” is achieved by the legal required 5-5 split of the board members by political party.  I would also posit that if members of one party think they shouldn’t talk to people between meetings because the balance is not there, and they are under the assumption that the other party isn’t doing that either, they may want to reconsider that assumption.
 
I felt a little disappointed after my first BOE meeting but I am not discouraged.  In fairness I imagine phone calls such as mine in the past have not been the norm.  Like many I took our election processes for granted.  In the last 1.5 years myriads of evidence and data have surfaced regarding elections and election processes and it is hard to keep up.  Even given frustrations I vent here, I am still optimistic that if the BOE and DOE become aware of the vulnerabilities they will want to both interact, and act.  

1.  Vote by "Mail In" Ballot?

2.  Vote by "Absentee Ballot"?

3.  Vote "In Person" during the "Early Voting" Period?

4.  Vote "In Person" on the day of election at your designated polling location?

5.  Something Else?

Before I provide my answer let me provide a little background:

In 2020 there were reports that people went to vote on the normal "day" of election and they were told that they can't vote?  Why?  They were told that they had already voted by “Mail-In” or “Absentee” ballot.

They most likely would have been told this right after they provided ID at the Electronic Poll Book station.   That's the little gizmo where you hand them your license and after they scan the license, they usually ask you to sign on the screen.  After you do they hand you an almost blank ballot.

Well in this case, after the ID was scanned, the poll worker probably said something like……..

Well this machine here says you have already sent back an Absentee or Mail-In ballot.  Now I can't let you vote here because you would be getting two votes and the machine here says I can't let that happen.  Oh and don't be mad at me it’s the machine saying that……  

I make light of this hypothetical poll worker blaming it on the machine, but in reality what was the poll worker supposed to do?   What evidence was there that the person in front of them at the time was telling the truth?   It was that person’s word vs. the machine!

Now if that happened to you as the voter you were probably upset for one of 3 reasons. Either:

1. you realized that you did have shall we say a forgetful moment and you are embarrassed, or

2. you were trying to cheat and got caught, or

3. you were upset because YOU KNOW YOU DID NOT send in an Absentee or Mail-In ballot and someone else got one in your name and sent it in and stole your vote.

Unfortunately, in Delaware I believe it is pretty easy for someone to get an Absentee Ballot in someone else's name.  If you want more information on that, go to the "Presentation" tab on the Delawarecounts.com web site starting about midway through the second video at the 4:16 minute mark and see how vulnerable the Absentee Voting process is here in Delaware.  It's a little discouraging.

I could go into further detail but let’s stop here for now.  With that background have you figured out the answer to the question yet?  In my opinion, the best answer is  #5.  Something Else.  

How I am going to vote?

1.  I am going to request an Absentee Ballot first, and then a Mail-In Ballot.  I can think of valid reasons they would have to send both and I will be curious to see if they do.  

2.  When the DOE sends me back either, or both Ballots, and associated Ballot Envelopes,  I AM NOT GOING TO FILL THEM OUT, AND I AM NOT GOING TO SEND  THEM BACK TO THE DOE.

3.  On election day, I am going to go vote in person as usual, but I will have my unused, original DOE Absentee and Mail In Ballot(s) and associated Ballot Envelopes in my pocket.

I think that if I vote this way, the chances are higher than normal that I will be allowed to vote, however, if I sign in at the Electronic Poll Book and someone tells me I have already voted by Absentee or Mail-In ballot I will first congratulate them and let them know they are about to be famous because they will have just proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that there is election fraud in Delaware.

 I will then pull out my Absentee and/ or Mail In ballot(s) in their pristine and unused condition and prove that I have not voted by Absentee or Mail In ballot and have others witness my statements to that effect.  

I think photographs or videos of the Electronic Poll Book screen and any other Department of Elections documentation that says I already voted would be appropriate.  

Someone may still have been able to steal my vote, but at least I will have a legal case and tangible evidence that I have not voted and that could move us further towards the ultimate solution of voting by hand marked, and hand counted ballots.

https://selectioncode.com

https://elections.delaware.gov/pubs/pdfs/Delaware's%20Express%20Vote%20XL%20Machine%20FAQs.pdf

Expressvote Xl

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